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INTRODUCTION 
This article uses economic criteria to assess the efficiency of select 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”).1 Signed in Vienna in 1980 and 
ratified by more than seventy countries, the CISG “applies to 
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business 
are in different [Contracting] States.”2 Reflecting diverse legal 
traditions, the CISG provides an interesting mix of civil and common 
law rules.3 When civil and common law rules coincide, the CISG 
typically adopts the convergent view.4 When they differ, the CISG 
sometimes adopts one approach and sometimes the other. In certain 
instances, the CISG creates alternative rules assumed to be the result 
of negotiation and compromise among the drafting nations.5 In other 
 
 1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
 2. Id. art. 1. Additionally, CISG jurisdiction applies if relevant private 
international or conflict of law rules “lead to the application of the law of a 
Contracting State,” thereby allowing for the application of CISG rules even if only 
one party has its place of business in a Contracting State. Id. art. 1(1)(b). However, 
some countries, most notably the United States, availed themselves of Article 95, 
which allows states to declare, upon ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession 
to the CISG, that they will not be bound by Article 1(1)(b) . Id. art. 95; Status of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=e 
n (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 3. See generally Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in 
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L 
LAW. 443 (1989). 
 4. See id. at 453 (“[T]he Convention reflects more a blending of the two legal 
traditions rather than the prevalence of one over the other.”). 
 5. See id. at 450 (recounting that the drafters of the CISG engaged in dynamic 
debates that ultimately led to compromises over the integration of concepts from 
different legal systems). 
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instances, the drafting nations failed to reach consensus resulting in 
gaps in the CISG that expressly exclude specific areas of law6 or 
amount to implicit delegation.7 
The goal of this article is to analyze whether the most efficient 
rules were selected from among the civil and common law 
alternatives or whether other considerations resulted in the election 
of a non-efficient alternative. Selection of an inefficient CISG rule 
takes one of two forms—either (1) a compromise away from a more 
efficient national rule8 or (2) a bargaining impasse leading to the 
abdication of efficient selection.9 The Chicago School’s normative 
goal of wealth maximization provides a useful benchmark with 
which to compare the efficiency of alternative contract law rules.10 
 
 6. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 4-5 (stating that CISG is not concerned with 
property rights or products liability). 
 7. See id. arts. 28, 78 (delegating to the states issues such as specific 
performance (Article 28) and the process of selling rejected goods (Article 88)). 
 8. See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how the United States compromised 
away from a more efficient national rule when it agreed not to have a writing 
requirement in the CISG—so as to better mirror civil law rules and promote 
conformity, notwithstanding the fact that its Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”) contains such a requirement). By electing not to opt out of the no 
writing requirement, the United States created divergent rules for its legal 
systems—one for domestic sales and one for international sales. Whatever one’s 
opinion of the efficiency of the statute of frauds, it is clear that applying different 
rules in similar situations is inefficient because it raises the level of uncertainty and 
increases transactions costs. See George L Priest, The Common Law Process and 
the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (1977) (explaining that 
inefficient rules impose higher costs than efficient rules because they result in the 
inefficient assignment of liability and greater avoidance costs). 
 9. See Carlo H. Mastellone, Sales-Related Issues Not Covered by the CISG: 
Assignment, Set-off, Statute of Limitations, Etc., Under Italian Law, 5 VINDOBONA 
J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 143, 147 (2001) (identifying a variety of issues within the 
scope of sales law that are not covered by the CISG as identified by foreign and 
Italian courts). A bargaining impasse can lead to a less comprehensive code or 
convention. In such cases, relevant issues may be excluded due to non-agreement. 
See infra Part II.A. (discussing the inefficiency of non-selectivity, with particular 
reference to the enforceability of penalty clauses). 
 10. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (7th ed. 2007) 
(defining efficiency in terms of wealth maximization). A rule that results in greater 
wealth maximization is more efficient than a rule that results in less wealth 
maximization. The wealth maximization principle asserts that distributional 
consequences should be irrelevant in the enforcement of contract rules since the 
key goal is an overall net gain in utility. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) 
(suggesting that contract law should encourage efforts of contracting parties to 
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To understand the efficiency implications of impasse, one needs to 
compare the wealth maximization implications of a centralized rule 
with the wealth implications of a decentralized and heterogeneous 
legal regime. 
The analysis proceeds in four parts followed by a conclusion. Part 
I begins with a brief history of the CISG, identifying the choices 
involved in the drafting process. It then discusses the central tenets of 
the economic analysis of law (“EAL”). Part II uses these tenets to 
assess the efficiency of specific CISG rules, including rules 
addressing liquidated damages, evidentiary rules governing the 
statute of frauds, such as the use of parol evidence, and rules 
addressing contract interpretation and formation. Part III discusses 
the implications of these CISG choices for best business practices. 
Part IV assesses the value of comparative EAL as a means of 
understanding and critiquing legal reforms. 
Taken collectively, the analysis illuminates the structure and 
choices incumbent in the CISG. It also illustrates the usefulness of 
EAL as a means of advancing comparative contract law. Over the 
last thirty years, EAL has emerged as a leading jurisprudential view, 
especially in the United States, that informs judicial decision-
making, legal education, and scholarly analysis. The present analysis 
demonstrates its usefulness in a comparative law context. 
I. CISG AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A.  DRAFTING THE CISG 
The CISG reflects a culmination of a century old process of failed 
attempts to achieve an international sales law.11 Given the differences 
in the legal systems involved—civil, socialist, and common law—the 
drafting process involved intense negotiation and compromise.12 
Compromise at times took the avenue of abdication. In areas such as 
 
maximize "contractual surplus”). 
 11. See PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR 
STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 2-3 (2007) (explaining that the development of the 
CISG can be traced back to the creation of the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) and the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL)). 
 12. See generally JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES (1989). 
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specific performance,13 validity,14 and pre-contractual liability,15 the 
CISG designates national law as the source of relevant rules. In this 
way, the CISG is less comprehensive than it potentially could have 
been as some areas of coverage are left to the inefficiency of the 
private international law system that the CISG was attempting to 
replace. Notwithstanding this and other limitations, the CISG 
embodies a major advance in international law. 
Generally speaking, one of the most important functions of any 
system of contract law is to offer to the parties a set of ready-made 
“default rules” that do not require bargaining.16 This function is 
undermined by a less comprehensive code, which does not offer the 
necessary mix of optimal defaults for the parties. Hence, in drafting 
the CISG, member states needed to agree on which default rules to 
embrace. Failure to agree threatened the overall efficiency of the 
system.17 
The drafters of the CISG had to select a core methodology in order 
to build an international sales law. They employed both the 
“common core” and “better rule” approaches.18 The common core 
 
 13. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (providing that “a court is not bound to 
enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its 
own law”). 
 14. See id. art. 4(a) (stating that the CISG is “not concerned with . . . the 
validity of the contract or of any of its provisions”). 
 15.  See id. art. 4 (noting that the CISG “governs only the formation of the 
contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer"). 
 16. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and 
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1992) (acknowledging that 
default rules apply only if the parties’ agreement fails to provide a necessary term). 
This is the gap-filling function of contract law. Like the U.C.C., the CISG is 
largely made up of default rules. Stated in the alternative, parties are free to 
derogate from most of the rules supplied by the U.C.C. or CISG. There is a deep 
literature discussing the notion of default rules. See, e.g., id. at 825-26 (arguing 
that by failing to provide a necessary term, contracting parties are consenting to the 
default rules; therefore, default rules are not the product of regulation but rather 
consent and private autonomy); see also Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default 
Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 490 (1989) 
(examining default rules in the context of the philosophy of promising and the 
implications thereto). 
 17. See generally HONNOLD, supra note 12. 
 18. See Ole Lando, The Common Core of European Private Law and the 
Principles of European Contract Law, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 809, 
809 (1998) (explaining that the “common core” approach is a comparative research 
method that is used to determine if there is a common core among differing legal 
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approach was used whenever the civil law and common law rules 
were essentially similar and there was little difference in national 
interpretations of those rules.19 The fact that the negotiators 
possessed expertise in both civil and common law framed the 
discussions. Given that background, the CISG reflects the common 
core of the major principles found in the civil and common law legal 
traditions. The common core approach is essentially a descriptive 
enterprise that provides a better understanding of the similar rules 
and principles found in most legal systems.20 
The better rule approach, by contrast, was needed whenever 
common law and civil law conflicted, or whenever national 
interpretations of facially similar rules varied.21 Implicit in this 
choice is the normative determination of whether alternative rules or 
interpretations are better. An extended analysis would ask whether 
fabrication of an alternative rule would prove even better in 
advancing the normative goals of an international sales law. 
1. Types of Rules 
Employing the common core and better rules approaches resulted 
in an interesting amalgam of common and civil law rules. The CISG 
consists of rules that can be characterized as: (1) rules consistent 
with both common and civil law legal traditions, (2) rules that 
recognize the superiority of a given common or civil law rule—at 
 
systems); see also Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to 
European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 347 (1998) (noting that the goal 
of the “common core” approach is “to provide with the highest degree of precision 
a map of the relevant elements of different legal systems”). 
 19. See Bussani & Mattei, supra note 18, at 340 (explaining that the purpose 
behind the common core approach is to unearth what European’s private law has in 
common with civil law, common law, and other western legal traditions). 
 20. See id. at 347 (“The fundamental characteristic of the common core 
research is that it analyzes the existing situation without trying in any way to force 
uniform solutions.”). 
 21. See Disa Sim, The Scope and Application of Good Faith in the Vienna 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in REVIEW OF THE 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 19, 63 
(Michael Maggi ed., 2004) (citing M.J. BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 65 (2d ed., 1997) (characterizing the better rule 
approach as having the purpose of adopting rules that are the most persuasive and 
well-suited for cross-border transactions, regardless of how many countries have 
adopted them for domestic use). 
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least for the sake of transborder transactions, (3) rules that are 
fabricated to be national system-neutral, (4) rules that abdicate to 
national law by expressly refusing to cover certain topics, and (5) 
rules that fit in one of the first three categories but are subject to 
modification by the CISG’s preference for original or autonomous 
interpretation of its rules.22 
The first category of rules has the closest affinity to a common 
core approach. The evolution of similar rules in different legal 
traditions may suggest that these rules reflect the needs of commerce 
and are inherently efficient,23 but this will not always be the case. 
There is no guarantee that the “common rules” found in both legal 
traditions are the “better rules.” Common rules possess value, 
however, because they tend to provide stability and to avoid 
misunderstandings between contracting parties. 
The second category of rules—the primary focus of the analysis in 
Part II—represents instances where there was a selection between 
opposing civil and common law rules. Consider, for example, the 
CISG’s rejection of the United States Uniform Commercial Code’s 
(“U.C.C.”) perfect tender rule24 in favor of a fundamental breach 
 
 22. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (stating that in interpreting the CISG 
“regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application”). It has generally been argued that regard to those 
goals implies original or autonomous interpretation of its Articles—that is, an 
interpretation not framed by the national law of the court (homeward trend bias). 
See Frank Diedrich, Maintaining Uniformity in International Uniform Law via 
Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 303, 312 (1996) (defining “autonomous interpretation” as “a supranational 
synthesis combining single methods that form a new canon of interpretation”); see 
also LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 6, 12 (2005) (urging that the “international 
character [of the CISG] calls for a non-domestic, autonomous interpretation . . . 
divorced from the idiosyncrasies of domestic jurisprudence”); Angela Maria 
Romito & Charles Sant ‘Elia, Comment, CISG: Italian Court and Homeward 
Trend, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 179, 185-86 (2002) (providing an example of the 
tendency to interpret the CISG through the prism of national law instead of a 
newly developed international legal methodology). 
 23. See Priest, supra note 8, at 72 (observing how legal rules tend to become 
more efficient as time passes because “efficient rules 'survive' in an evolutionary 
sense because they are less likely to be relegated and thus less likely to be 
changed” while “inefficient rules 'perish' because they are more likely to be 
reviewed and review implies the chance of change”). 
 24. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1977) (allowing a buyer to reject the seller’s goods if 
they “fail in any respect to conform to the contract”). 
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rule.25 Given the distribution system and readily available secondary 
markets in the United States, the U.C.C. provides a right to the buyer 
to reject non-conforming goods for any reason.26 The reselling and 
reshipping of goods within domestic markets is manageable, and thus 
a pro-buyer rule is reasonable in such a context.27 In contrast, this 
rule in the international context proves problematic. The higher costs 
of reselling or reshipping the goods are likely to lead to waste. Due 
to such costs and a lack of a readily available secondary market, the 
seller may simply elect not to retrieve the goods. In order to 
discourage such waste, the CISG limits the buyer’s right to reject.28 
This reflects the more efficient choice because the buyer is in a better 
position to make use of or resell the nonconforming goods. The 
CISG protects the buyer by providing a price reduction remedy, not 
found in the common law, which allows the buyer to unilaterally 
reduce the contract price to reflect the diminishment of value caused 
by the nonconformity.29 In the end, the seller avoids the costs of 
retrieving the goods and the buyer is made whole through a price 
reduction.30 
 
 25. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 49 (permitting the buyer to avoid the 
contract if the seller commits a “fundamental breach,” which is defined as a breach 
that detriments the buyer to the extent that it “substantially” deprives him of “what 
he is entitled to expect under the contract”). 
 26. U.C.C. § 2-601(a) (1977). 
 27. Cf. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 373, 375 (1990) (urging that non-contract sanctions such as 
relationship-destroying and reputational costs likely curtail the use of the rule as a 
bad faith means to terminate a contract). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 
(1963). This does not however solve the moral hazard problem where the buyer 
uses the perfect tender rule in order to avoid the contract in a market with falling 
prices. The solution is the seller negotiating a modification to the rule in the 
contract. See William H. Lawrence, The Revision of Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Appropriate Standards of a Buyer’s Refusal to Keep Gods 
Tendered by a Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1650-51 (1994) (indicating 
further the possibility to counter this potential problem by adding a requirement of 
good faith on the part of the buyer). 
 28. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 49 (requiring the breach to be 
“fundamental”—or that the buyer is substantially deprived of contract 
expectations). 
 29. See id. art. 50 (permitting a reduction to contract price at time of delivery 
regardless of whether the contract price was already paid to the seller ). 
 30. The buyer is also able to collect any other damages that it incurred due to 
the delivery of nonconforming goods. See, e.g., Delchi Carter, SpA v. Rotorex 
Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1994) 
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Despite the general similarities of the sales law of the 
representative countries, there remained a significant number of 
differences in which a choice between civil and common law had to 
be made. Examples include: (1) the adoption of the civil law’s 
receipt rule31 for the effectiveness of acceptances over the common 
law’s dispatch or mailbox rule;32 (2) the selection of the civil law’s 
material breach rule for rejection or avoidance of contracts over the 
American U.C.C.’s perfect tender rule;33 (3) the selection of the civil 
law’s enforcement of purely oral sales agreements over the U.C.C.’s 
statute of frauds;34 and (4) the rejection of the common law’s parol 
evidence rule in favor of the free admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence.35 
The third category of rules recognizes that the CISG drafters, in 
rare instances, fabricated new rules instead of adopting existing 
(common or competing) national rules. Unfortunately, from an 
efficiency perspective this does not always result in the adoption of 
better rules. For example, the no-writing/writing hybrid rule 
embodied by Articles 11 and 1236 was an inefficient political 
compromise resulting from an attempt to incorporate opposing rules 
into a unified law.37  
 
(awarding the buyer compensatory damages for the buyer’s attempts to remedy the 
nonconformity of seller’s goods because the damages were foreseeable as a result 
of the seller’s breach). 
 31. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 18 (“An acceptance of an offer becomes 
effective at the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror.”). 
 32. See U.C.C. § 2-206 (1977) (inviting acceptance of an offer by “any manner 
and by any [reasonable] medium”); see also infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the 
mailbox rule). 
 33. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the writing requirement). Compare U.C.C. 
§ 2-201 (imposing a writing requirement), with CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 (“A 
contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing . . . .”). 
 35. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the parol evidence rule). Compare U.C.C. 
§ 2-202 (1977) (“Terms . . . set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement . . . may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior 
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .”), with CISG, supra note 
1, art. 8 (casting a wide net for all evidence relevant to the interpretation of 
contract terms—including prior conduct and negotiation history). 
 36. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 11-12 (indicating that contracts for sale need 
not be in writing per Article 11, unless one of the parties resides in a Contracting 
State which has made an Article 96 declaration under the CISG per Article 12). 
 37.  See infra Part II.B.1 (commenting on the inherent inefficiency of such a 
system). 
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The fourth category involves nonselective inefficiency—or the 
failure to provide any rules or coverage. There are numerous places 
where the CISG fails to provide rules in areas that a more 
comprehensive international code would cover. For example, the 
negotiating parties failed to agree on a legal regime in areas such as 
product liability and specific performance.38 Hence, the CISG is less 
comprehensive than it could be and, as a consequence, is less 
efficient than it should be since it fails to harmonize international 
sales law in these (and other) areas.39 Generally, rules from different 
legal systems competed for recognition, and in most cases one of the 
competitors was selected.40 Where the negotiators were unable to 
agree on the better rule, compromise often resulted in abdication or 
removal of coverage.41 
The fifth and final category of rules involves issues of 
interpretation. These rules reflect the temporal nature of fixed rules. 
The evolution of rule application and adjustment, obtained by 
studying the resulting jurisprudence, has led to a voluminous CISG 
 
 38. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 5, 28 (expressly excluding coverage over 
products liability for personal injury and implicitly delegating the issue of specific 
performance to states). 
 39. See Sim, supra note 21, at 61 (reasoning that due to a lack of coherence in 
the CISG’s good faith concept and no explanation of the concept’s meaning given 
by any delegate of the convention, the predictability and efficiency of good faith in 
international sales will be undermined as domestic decision makers interpret the 
concept in varying ways). 
 40. See Avery W. Katz, Remedies for Breach of Contract under the CISG, 25 
INT. REV. L. ECON. 378, 378, 384 (2006) (offering examples where the drafters 
preferred one legal tradition over another, such as the CISG’s selection of the civil 
law’s specific relief rules rather the common law’s preference for monetary 
damages). Selections like this are sometimes obscured by the CISG’s usage of 
terms not readily found in any national legal system. This phenomenon ostensibly 
advances the notion of neutrality and encourages autonomous interpretation of the 
rules. Thus, words like “avoidance,” “fundamental breach,” and “non-conformity” 
are utilized instead of the common law’s “rejection,” “material breach,” and 
“defect.” CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25, 35, 81; see Vikki M. Rogers & Albert H. 
Kritzer, A Uniform International Sales Law Terminology, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
PETER SCHLECHTRIEM ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 223, 237 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & 
Günter Hager eds., 2003), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/ 
cisg/biblio/rogers2.html (stating that in legal research using domestic terminology, 
such as “rescission of the contract,” a lawyer would not find CISG cases that 
typically use the phrase “avoidance of the contract”). 
 41. See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 4 (declaring that the CISG is concerned 
with the formation of contracts rather than the validity of contracts). 
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literature.42 The important point here is that even where the drafters 
chose between competing national rules, the CISG expressly rejects 
the use of any corresponding national jurisprudence43 and instead 
espouses original interpretation of its rules.44 CISG interpretive 
methodology requires the interpretation of CISG rules based upon 
the general principles underlying the CISG, not by concepts found in 
a domestic legal system.45 This approach aims to foster a “better 
jurisprudence” in the future interpretation of CISG rules. The judicial 
or arbitral interpreter is mandated to interpret CISG rules with regard 
to the CISG’s “international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application.”46 This requires the search for original 
interpretations47 and rejects “homeward trend” bias48 in which 
national rules and jurisprudence are used to fill in interpretive gaps. 
The fact that the drafters often selected national, system-neutral 
terminology—such as avoidance, non-conformity, and fundamental 
breach—indicates their desire for the development of original, 
uniform, and more efficient interpretations of CISG rules.49 
 
 42. See Bibliography, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L., 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/biblio.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) 
(containing a bibliography with 9,069 citations to works on the CISG). 
 43. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7 (“In the interpretation of this Convention, 
regard is to be had to its international character . . . .”); Franco Ferrari, Uniform 
Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 
200-01 (1994) (urging that an interpreter of the CISG “should not read the 
Convention through the lenses of domestic law, but should project the interpretive 
problems against an international background”). 
 44. See Ferrari, supra note 43, at 198-201 (describing the interpretation of the 
CISG as independent and not reliant on any specific legal system). 
 45. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Gap-Filling and Interpretation of the CISG: 
Overview of International Case Law, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 63, 
65 (2003) (indicating that CISG should be interpreted autonomously even though 
once it is in full force, it is integrated into domestic law). 
 48. See, e.g., Timoth N. Tuggey, Note, The 1980 United Nations Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 540, 554 (1986) (warning that a homeward trend bias would undermine 
the goal of the CISG to promote uniformity). 
 49. See U.N. Comm. on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Introduction to the 
Digest of Case Law on the United Nations Sales Convention, Note by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/562 (June 9, 2004) (“The drafters of the 
Convention took special care in avoiding the use of legal concepts typical of a 
given legal tradition, concepts often accompanied by a wealth of well-established 
case law and related literature that would not be easy to transplant in different legal 
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2. Summary 
The drafters of the CISG faced a number of dilemmas in 
negotiating a convention to supersede the legal rules of both civil and 
common law countries. The first was selecting among inherently 
conflictive rules. Examples include the writing requirement (statute 
of frauds) and the parol evidence rule. Generally, these two doctrines 
are prominent in common law systems50 but not as pervasive or 
formalized in civil law countries.51 Other examples include the 
perfect tender rule found in the U.C.C. versus the fundamental or 
material breach rule in the civil law,52 and the civil law’s receipt rule 
versus the common law’s dispatch rule in the area of effectiveness of 
acceptance.53  
The second dilemma when drafting the CISG was whether to 
incorporate or ignore legal concepts that exist in one system but are 
foreign to the other system. Examples of incorporation include the 
adoption of the price reduction remedy54 and Nachfrist notice,55 both 
 
cultures.”); C.M BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 74 (1987) (“When drafting the 
single provisions these experts had to find sufficiently neutral language on which 
they could reach a common understanding.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca, Implementation of Contract Formation Statute 
of Frauds, Parol Evidence, and Battle of Forms CISG Provisions in Common Law 
Countries, 25 J.L. & COM. 133, 134 (2005) (making the point that Article 11 of the 
CISG was initially misapplied in the United States, a common law country, 
because the U.S. has a statute of fraud provision for the sale of goods); see also id. 
at 142-43 (discussing MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova 
D'Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1392-93 (11th Cir. 1998), where the court held 
that the U.S. parol evidence rule did not apply in cases implicating the CISG). 
 51. Cf. Joshua D. H. Karton & Lorraine de Germiny, Has the CSIG Advisory 
Council Come of Age?, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 448, 470 (“Civil law has no rules 
analgous to these doctrines . . . .”). 
 52. See Jürgen Basedow, Towards a Universal Doctrine of Breach of Contract: 
The Impact of the CISG, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 487, 493 (2005) (concluding 
that the concept of breach as found in CISG Article 46 is indicative of the common 
law but also “introduces a new category of non-conformity into civil law 
jurisdictions”). 
 53. See, e.g., Marwan Al Ibrahim, Ala’eldin Ababneh & Hisham Tahat, The 
Postal Acceptance Rule in the Digital Age, 2 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 47, 47 
(2007) (explaining the common law’s dispatch or mail box rule as constituting 
acceptance upon mailing or posting). 
 54. CISG, supra note 1, art. 50; see Eric E. Bergsten & Anthony J. Miller, The 
Remedy of Reduction of Price, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 255, 255, 265, 271 (1979) 
(detailing the drafting history of the price reduction remedy and evaluating its 
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of which are foreign to common law systems. A vague and 
potentially crippling abdication of coverage is found in the deference 
of Article 4 to national law on issues pertaining to validity. This 
abdication was largely due to countries’ desire to protect the 
operation of their consumer protection laws.56 Unfortunately, the 
CISG fails to provide a definition of “validity,” which may allow 
Article 4 to be used to invalidate contract terms intended to be 
covered by the CISG. The use of Article 4 to adopt nation-specific 
rules undermines the CISG’s unifying goal and diminishes its overall 
efficiency.57 
B.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW 
The EAL movement in the United States traces its modern roots to 
the 1960s,58 but the milestone event is the 1973 publication of Judge 
 
implications). 
 55. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 47, 48, 63; see Ericson P. Kimbel, Nachfrist 
Notice and Avoidance under the CISG, 18 J.L. & COM. 301, 302, 305-07 (1999) 
(explaining that Nachfrist notice “is the Convention's only route to avoidance 
without an initial fundamental breach” as it provides a notice procedure through 
which, upon a failed delivery, the buyer gives notice to the seller that he has a 
reasonable time period to fully perform and upon expiration of such time, if the 
seller has not performed, then the buyer may declare avoidance per CISG Article 
26). 
 56. See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN-CONVENTION 
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 32 (1986) ( “Economic 
regulations such as export or import controls or consumer-protection laws which 
prohibit certain formulations may void contracts falling under the Convention”). 
 57. See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity 
Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (1993) (asserting that the CISG’s abdication in this area 
“raises difficult questions, such as how a tribunal is to ascertain which issues are 
validity issues and to what extent applying non-uniform domestic rules of validity . 
. . seriously handicaps the CISG’s potential for achieving its goals”). 
 58. See generally Ronald H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 239 (1993) (discussing the origins of EAL at the University of Chicago); 
Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 56-
64 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (discussing the intellectual history 
of the debate on law and economics). Three influential works in the area of EAL 
are Becker on crimes and punishment, Calabresi on torts, and Coase on property. 
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution 
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.59 Posner’s approach is 
part of the Chicago School of EAL, asserting that common law rules 
evolve efficiently.60 The idea of EAL also developed in Europe and 
led to the establishment of the European Association of Law and 
Economics (“EALE”).61  
EAL scholarship developed into a major school of legal thought in 
American law schools,62 despite the reluctant reception and outright 
opposition of the late seventies and early eighties.63 Additionally, 
EAL is now a major force in American legal theory and exerts a 
dominant influence on contract law in particular.64 Today, it is very 
difficult to find an American contract law monograph or law review 
article not discussing EAL arguments.65 EAL scholars have produced 
 
 59. See POSNER, supra note 10. Posner’s 1973 text entered its seventh edition 
in 2007. 
 60. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979) (indicating that inefficient rules “will be progressively 
ignored and eventually forgotten” over time while the efficient rules remain); 
Priest, supra note 8, at 65 (urging that the "tendency toward efficiency is a 
characteristic of the common law process"); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common 
Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977) (discussing Posner’s persuasive 
argument regarding the relationship between the common law and economic 
efficiency). 
 61. See, e.g., Roberto Pardolesi & Giuseppe Bellantuono, Law and Economics 
in Italy, FINDLAW.COM, 244, 245 (1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0345book.pdf 
(asserting that EAL can be traced in Europe back to the 1961 work of Pietro 
Trimarchi on strict liability, written around the same time Coase and Calabresi 
were writing their respective articles). EALE “is the institutional response to the 
increasing importance of the economic analysis of law in Europe[.] EALE was 
founded in 1984 with the purpose of providing assistance to law and economics 
scholars and bringing their scholarship to a wider audience, including policy 
makers, legislators and judges.” Mission Statement, EUR. ASS’N L. & ECON., 
http://law.haifa.ac.il/eale/site/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 62. See Symposium, The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL 
ED. 183 (1983) (documenting the early influence of Chicago-style EAL in U.S. law 
schools). 
 63. See generally Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent Criticisms of the 
Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (1981); Daniel T. 
Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of 
Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193 (1998). 
 64. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No “Efficient Breach” in the Civil Law?: A 
Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 721, 722 (“Law and economics scholarship dominates much of the work 
in antitrust, contracts, and torts, just to name a few areas.”). 
 65. See Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three 
Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 829 (2003) (“[M]any scholars 
2011] COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY 385 
a depth of literature analyzing EAL in contract law areas such as 
breach, remedies, impossibility, and commercial impracticability.66 
On the other hand, EAL historically was not a major theoretical 
force in Europe, but recently has become more widely studied in 
European and comparative law literature.67 Some of the conclusions 
of EAL theory were more readily accepted while others failed to gain 
widespread acceptance. For example, the theory of efficient 
breach68—broadly embraced by EAL scholars in the United States—
was largely rejected in Europe.69 Professor Mattei offers an 
explanation for this: 
On policy grounds, moreover, it is not clear that efficient breaches should 
be encouraged by a legal system, since in the long run the certainty of 
property rights may be undermined. This is the reason why most legal 
systems of the civil law tradition tend to resist efficient breaches (at least 
in theory), and why they have traditionally assigned a more central role to 
specific performance than has common law.70 
 
would agree [that EAL] has become the dominant academic style of contract 
theory.”). 
 66. For a survey of EAL for contract law, see generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaeert & Gerrit De Gees eds., 2000); THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). 
 67. See, e.g., Viktor Winkler, Some Realism About Rationalism: Economic 
Analysis of Law in Germany, 6 GERM. L. J. 1033, 1033-34 (2005) (discussing the 
publication in Germany of American EAL classics, which introduced German 
legal scholars to the EAL debate). For a review of the uneven reception of EAL in 
Europe and elsewhere in the late 1980s, see generally Christian Kirchner, The 
Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON 
277 (1991); Lionel Montagné, Law and Economics in France, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 66, at 150; Shozo Ota, Law and Economics 
in Japan: Hatching Stage, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 301 (1991); Santos Pastor, 
Law and Economics in Spain, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 309 (1991). 
 68. See Posner, supra note 65, at 834-36 (discussing the evolution of academic 
writings regarding efficient breach—the notion that sometimes breach of contract 
is the most efficient result). This article returns to the issue of remedies, infra Part 
II.A (addressing liquidated damages). 
 69. See Scalise, supra note 64, at 723 (“Encouraging breach of contract is 
immoral, and civilian contract theory, which is pervaded with a concept of good 
faith, properly refuses to recognize efficient breach.”). Efficient breach theory has 
also been criticized in the United States. See generally Daniel Friedmann, The 
Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient 
Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982). 
 70. Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in 
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This view of efficient breach is consistent with those offered by 
the critics of EAL in the United States.71 Thus, European rejection of 
the efficient breach theory is not itself evidence that economic 
reasoning plays no role in civil law. Rather, the rejection suggests 
that in civil law systems the comparative efficiency of specific 
performance as an ordinary remedy—or any other contract rule for 
that matter—can be assessed only on a rule by rule basis.72 
Notwithstanding objections from abroad, EAL provides a means 
of both understanding and critiquing the structure and content of the 
CISG. In comparing alternative academic theories of contract law, 
Eric Posner concludes that “[o]nly economic analysis seems to be on 
solid footing.”73 He recognizes the highly nuanced nature of EAL 
theory and the difficulty of empirically testing many of its assertions, 
but he nonetheless finds value in its approach. He writes, “[e]ven if 
economic analysis cannot determine the magnitude of [economic] 
costs and benefits, and the extent to which they offset or interact with 
each other, the judge who knows about them is more likely to make a 
wise decision than a judge who does not.”74 
This article organizes the economic logic of contract law with 
reference to three central tenets of EAL: deferring to individual 
autonomy, reducing transactions costs, and providing stability in 
transactions. Although alternate schemes are possible, these tenets 
provide a means of keeping the discussion tractable. Taken 
collectively, they provide a basis for the comparative EAL analysis 
of the CISG that follows. 
 
Contracts, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 429 (1995). Mattei further notes that the 
insertion of penalty clauses and the shifting of risk increases the contract price and 
does not discourage efficient breach. Id. 
 71. The normative argument against the theory is that breaches (efficient or 
not) should not be aided by contract law given the moral basis of promise-keeping. 
See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981). 
 72. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 69, at 953 (analyzing the legitimacy of the 
simple-efficient-breach conclusion that the specific performance rule is 
inefficient). 
 73. See Posner, supra note 65, at 829-30 (comparing EAL with theories of 
contract based on doctrine, philosophy, and cognitive psychology). 
 74. Id. at 854-55. 
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1. Deferring to Individual Autonomy 
Economic reasoning begins with the proposition that individuals 
are in a better position to understand what is in their own best 
interests than courts or governments.75 Individual preferences are 
highly idiosyncratic and, presumably, individuals do not agree to an 
exchange unless they feel that the agreement will advance their own 
interests.76 Based on this assumption, a voluntary exchange, duly 
consummated, puts both parties in a better situation.77 This pareto-
superior perspective of private exchange has been the primary tenet 
of economic theory since Adam Smith.78 For Smith, the relative 
wealth of nations depends on their degree of specialization.79 
Specialization, in turn, depends on the establishment of free markets. 
An efficient market facilitates private exchange, enables 
specialization, and promotes economic growth.80 
 
 75. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, And Market Illusions: The 
Limits Of Law And Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1309-10 (1986) (citing 
Norman Frolich et al., Beyond Economic Man: Altruism, Egalitarianism and 
Difference Maximizing, 28 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1984)) (describing EAL's 
foundational tenet that "man is a ‘rational maximizer of self-interest’"). The view 
of individual autonomy that motivates EAL is far from obvious. Many cognitive 
scientists and postmodern philosophers insist that human preferences cannot be 
separated from a cultural context. In other words, culture precedes the individual. 
See generally JEFFREY REIMAN, JUSTICE AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1990) 
(identifying the notion of autonomy with a “radical theory” of human agency). 
Like neoclassical economics generally, EAL asserts the primacy of the individual. 
See Anthony Ogus, What Legal Scholars Can Learn from Law and Economics, 79 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 383, 400 (2004) (discussing how EAL rests on the basic 
assumption of individual autonomy). 
 76. See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 3-4 (1996) (defining 
“individual preferences” broadly so as to include habits, addictions, and even the 
influence of parents, peers, and advertising). 
 77. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, ECONOMICS: BETWEEN PREDICTIVE SCIENCE 
AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 26-29 (1987) (asserting that the potential for gains from 
trade provides virtually the only lesson of economic theory). 
 78. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 187 (7th ed. 
1968) (noting that for Adam Smith, specialization fostered by the gains of trade 
was practically the sole determinant of economic progress). 
 79. See id. at 187 (describing Adam Smith's belief that division of labor alone 
"‘accounts 'for the superior affluence and abundance commonly possessed even by 
[the] lowest and most despised member of Civilized society'"). See generally 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1776) (providing the 
seminal statement of classical economics). 
 80. See generally SMITH, supra note 79 (addressing the relationship between 
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The private laws of property, tort, and contract provide the legal 
foundations of market transactions.81 Property law identifies 
alienable entitlements; tort law protects such entitlements; and 
contract law enables the exchange of those entitlements. Due 
deference to individual autonomy not only respects the rights of 
individuals but also promotes economic ends.82 In contract law, this 
translates to a regime of free contracting. 
No one has been more articulate in explaining the economics of 
free contracting than the Austrian economist, Friedrich Hayek.83 To 
Hayek, markets provide a means of coping with the dispersal of 
information in society.84 Market actors carry idiosyncratic knowledge 
as to how resources can best be used in society. Much of this 
knowledge is difficult, if not impossible, to communicate. Hayek saw 
two alternatives: central planning and free markets.85 He concluded 
that central planning does not work. The government simply does not 
hold sufficient information to direct the workings of a modern 
economy.86 
Free markets, according to Hayek, provide a means of addressing 
information problems.87 Two contract principles underscore free 
markets—freedom to contract and freedom from contract.88 Freedom 
to contract means that individuals should be allowed to exchange 
 
efficient markets, division of labor, and economic growth). 
 81. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 
(1924). 
 82. See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. 
& ECON. 293, 293-95 (1975) (distinguishing between libertarian and utilitarian 
justifications for the principle of deferring to individual autonomy). 
 83. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 107-18 (1948) (articulating the seminal argument in defense of 
decentralized markets). 
 84. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 519-20 (1945) (lamenting that the issue with rational economic order is 
that knowledge "never exists in concentrated or integrated form"). 
 85. See id. at 520-21 (commenting that free markets still involve planning, but 
that it is here divided among individuals). 
 86. See id. at 524 (urging that "communicating all . . . knowledge to a central 
board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders" is not effective). 
 87. See id. (indicating that decentralization of economic order ensures that the 
information will be timely used). 
 88. See generally Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & 
COM. 193 (1982). 
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their entitlements free from government restrictions.89 Freedom from 
contract means that the government should not force individuals to 
transfer entitlements without their consent.90 By insisting that each 
party secure the consent of the other, a regime of free contracting 
enables each party to signal their idiosyncratic preferences and 
communicate private information. Free contracting enables 
meaningful prices to emerge, which in turn can direct the workings 
of a decentralized economy. 
In short, the first economic tenet provides a presumption against 
governmental intervention into the substance of private agreements. 
Both forced transfers (required contract terms) and prohibited 
transfers (contract terms that are prohibited by public policy) 
frustrate the price system and erode efficiency.91 Alternatively stated, 
contract terms that reflect the subjective agreement of the parties 
should be readily and strictly enforced. 
 2. Reducing Transaction Costs 
Whereas deference to private autonomy provides an overarching 
goal, tone, and orientation to EAL, the second tenet, reducing 
transactions costs, provides the details. Market activities are 
promoted by providing contract rules that reduce the costs of private 
exchanges, including the costs of negotiation, performance, and 
enforcement.92 In a seminal work articulating the economic logic of 
contract law, Richard Posner and Anthony Kronman identify three 
ways contract law can reduce transaction costs: (1) by providing a 
remedy for breach, contract law encourages performance of mutually 
agreed upon terms; (2) by offering standard terms, the law reduces 
the need to negotiate; and (3) by punishing fraud and other 
 
 89. Id. at 195. 
 90. Id. at 196. 
 91. See id. at 195-96 (implying that the classical contract system, which, 
among other things, requires mutual assent and promotes economic efficiency, is 
the key to economic growth). 
 92. See David K. Lutz, The Law and Economics of Securities Fraud: Section 
29(A) and the Non-Reliance Clause, 29 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 818-19 (2004) 
(suggesting that efficient rules would not only assist parties in codifying the 
appropriate rights and obligations in a contract but also help predict the 
interpretation of such terms, particularly in light of the fact that the conflicting 
economic interests of contracting parties often encourage them to leave gaps in the 
contract’s scope). 
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improprieties during contract negotiations, the law deters misleading 
conduct.93 
The first economic function of contract law is to determine which 
transfers will be enforced and which will not. Deference to autonomy 
suggests that the court should enforce every transfer subjectively 
agreed to by the affected parties and withhold enforcement of any 
transfer not subjectively understood.94 As a practical matter, 
however, it is difficult to resolve or prove subjective claims of intent. 
Hence, courts must look for objective manifestations as a surrogate 
for subjective intent.95 
Most contract rules address this evidentiary function. For example, 
rules that require specificity in contracts, require a writing, demand 
conformity with offer and acceptance rules, or inquire into the 
presence of fraud all provide objective evidence of subjective intent. 
The inevitable slippage—the divergence between subjective and 
objective intent produced by the fact that objective evidence is 
second best or indirect evidence of subjective intent—in these 
evidentiary surrogates results in both over-enforcement and under-
enforcement of contractual language.96 Over-enforcement occurs 
when courts enforce transfers not reflective of any subjective 
agreement. Under-enforcement results when courts refuse to enforce 
agreements ex post that were subjectively understood ex ante. The 
second tenet of EAL suggests that rules should minimize the sum of 
over-enforcement and under-enforcement costs.97 
 
 93. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 4-5. 
 94. But cf. id. at 5 (indicating, however, that enforcement of a contract even 
when the terms may not be agreed upon by both parties discourages carelessness in 
the contractual process). 
 95. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
269, 272 (1986) (“It has long been recognized that a system of contractual 
enforcement would be unworkable if it adhered to a will theory requiring a 
subjective inquiry into the putative promisor’s intent.”). See generally LARRY A. 
DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT 
(1998) (providing an historical analysis of the evolution and fabrication of the 
reasonable person standard). 
 96. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The 
Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 
293 (1997) (examining the divergence of the objective theory of contract and the 
subjectivity involved in its application). 
 97. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 5 (observing that “only a 
contract that involves a meeting of the minds satisfies an economist’s definition of 
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Contract rules also reduce transaction costs by providing default 
terms that help fill the gaps in contractual language. It is not cost 
effective, or even possible, for parties to account for all contractual 
contingencies ex ante. Contractual activity, like life, is simply too 
complex and multifaceted. Contract law responds with standard 
terms.98 EAL suggests that these terms should reflect customary 
expectations so as to facilitate subjective agreement.99 Difficulties 
arise when the parties do not share similar customs. In such 
situations, EAL supports a preference for industry customs, so as to 
provide an incentive for all parties to learn the language and usages 
of the particular trade.100 
EAL also generates insights into the substantive content of default 
terms. Most contract or default terms allocate risk between the 
contracting parties. Both parties benefit if these costs are allocated to 
the party who can best absorb them at a lower cost.101 Such an 
allocation generates an exchange surplus that the parties can divide. 
EAL suggests that default rules reflect this cost reduction logic.102 
For example, an implied warranty of merchantability assigns the risk 
of a faulty product to the merchant seller, the party best able to take 
precautions and to insure against non-conforming products. 
Similarly, liability for damage to goods in shipment typically rests 
with the common carrier, the party best able to take efficient 
precautions and insure against loss. 
Finally, contract law reduces transaction costs by deterring fraud 
and other negotiation improprieties. To this end, the law must 
 
a value-maximizing exchange”). Kronman and Posner note, however, that EAL 
allows for “rules designed to prevent people from misleading others into thinking 
that they have a contract with them; hence both the subjective and objective 
theories have a place in contract law.” Id. 
 98. See Barnett, supra note 16, at 823-25 (providing analysis of the gap filling 
function of contract law, which reads into a contract default terms where the 
contract is otherwise silent). 
 99. Ostas, supra note 63, at 232. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related 
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 
(1977) (characterizing the economic efficiency of contracting in terms of 
maximizing of the aggregate value of an exchange). 
 102. See Ostas, supra note 63, at 232 (stating that, in general, EAL looks to use 
the law to lessen transaction costs). 
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balance two forms of welfare-diminishing opportunism.103 On one 
hand, one party could mislead the other into agreeing to a transfer the 
latter party did not fully understand. On the other hand, the party 
asserting the fraud may be trying to avoid a bad bargain. Both types 
of opportunism generate costs. An efficient contract law system 
minimizes the sum of these costs. Such calculations inform the laws 
of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, mutual mistake, 
and unconscionability.104 
In sum, the logic of cost reduction provides a powerful heuristic. 
Although the logic can be complex and multi-faceted, EAL benefits 
from sharpness of focus. Virtually every contract rule impacts 
transaction costs, thus providing a useful benchmark for comparative 
efficiency analysis. 
 3. Providing Stability 
For contract rules to accomplish desired instrumental effects, the 
content of the rules needs to be effectively communicated to the 
affected parties. EAL “views law as an incentive structure” that 
directs business conduct.105 The importance of predictability and 
stability in the law is particularly important in the international 
context of the CISG. Transacting parties need to be alerted to gaps in 
the CISG and to interpretations developed by CISG tribunals.  
The third tenet of EAL emphasizes the need for legal predictability 
and stability in international transactions. In a number of areas, the 
CISG failed to select a stable rule simply by not covering certain 
areas of contract law within its jurisdictional scope.106 One area of 
non-selective inefficiency is the duty to negotiate in good faith. The 
duty of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations is unknown to the 
common law.107 One efficiency argument in favor of the duty of good 
 
 103. Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic 
Model and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 551-52 (1992) . 
 104. See id. (charting the factors and implications in evaluating the negotiation 
process of contracts). 
 105. Ostas, supra note 63, at 213. 
 106. See Carlo H. Mastellone, Sales-Related Issues Not Covered by the CISG: 
Assignment, Set-off, Statute of Limitations, Etc., Under Italian Law, 5 VINDOBONA 
J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 143, 147-52 (2001) (presenting an aggregate analysis 
based on Italian, German, Argentine, and other states parties’ case law). 
 107. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private 
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 143-
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faith in negotiation is that the ability to negotiate in bad faith creates 
incentives for opportunism and moral hazard as well as results in 
adverse selection effects. Additionally, the increase in transaction 
costs leads to a suboptimal number of concluded contracts. However, 
the CISG does not recognize such a requirement even though it 
adopts the duty of good faith in the interpretation of CISG rules.108 
The fact that the CISG contains numerous gaps in the scope of its 
coverage causes a number of problems. One commentator states, 
“[b]ecause uniform rules are lacking, similarly situated parties 
sometimes receive vastly different results; the disparities undermine 
the purpose of the CISG.”109 The abdication of authority over areas 
clearly within the body of sales law makes the CISG less 
comprehensive and more inefficient than a law drafted with fewer 
intended gaps. That being said, this article is primarily focused on 
determining the relative efficiency of the rules found in the CISG. 
The relative or comparative efficiency analysis is accomplished by 
comparing the rule options available to the drafters with the rule that 
was actually incorporated into the CISG. The options available can 
be described as those provided by competing civil and common law 
rules, a compromised or modified version of one of those rules, or 
the creation of a new, system-neutral rule. Ultimately, the 
comparative efficiency analysis is based on whether the chosen rule 
 
44 (2000) (indicating that the civil law’s good faith doctrine tends to bind parties to 
contracts in situations where the common law would not recognize an enforceable 
agreement). The civil law also assesses contractual damages for bad faith, allowing 
plaintiffs to recover reliance damages under the tort doctrine of culpa en 
contrahendo. Id. Even though the common law rejects a duty to negotiate in good 
faith, more and more courts have allowed the recovery of reliance damages when 
negotiations include a “preliminary agreement.” Professors Schwartz and Scott 
have argued that such recovery is economically efficient. They argue that 
preliminary agreements allow for “the realization of a socially efficient 
opportunity.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and 
Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 662 (2007). Therefore, they 
conclude that “contract law should encourage relation-specific investments in 
preliminary agreements by awarding the promisee his verifiable reliance if the 
promisor has strategically delayed investment.” Id. 
 108. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7 (providing that in the interpretation of the 
CISG, “regard is to be given to . . . the observance of good faith in international 
trade”). 
 109. John Y. Gotanda, Using the UNIDROIT Principles to Fill Gaps in the 
CISG 2 (Villanova University School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Article No. 2007-18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1019277. 
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provides a stable or predictable outcome when applied to similarly 
situated circumstances or fact patterns. 
II. ASSESSING THE EFFICIENCY OF CISG RULES 
EAL provides a powerful heuristic with which to assess the CISG. 
Part II of this article begins with an assessment of the CISG 
treatment of liquidated damages. The CISG failed to take a stand on 
liquidated damages—and the enforceability of penalties—leaving 
this issue to national legal systems.110 This is an example of non-
selective inefficiency. Part II then turns to the evidentiary rules 
embodied in the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule. In this 
area, the CISG chose to follow the civil law.111 Part II concludes with 
a discussion of CISG rules pertaining to contract interpretation and 
contract formation—areas in which the CISG drafters tended to 
fabricate compromise positions. 
A.  LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
The voiding of all penalty clauses in the common law112 produced 
a significant amount of EAL literature.113 Commentators are split 
 
 110. Katz, supra note 40, at 387. 
 111. See Peter L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey 
Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal 
Academics in the United States, 27 J.L. & COM. 1, 22 (2008) (indicating the CISG's 
lack of a writing requirement in Article 11 or a parol evidence rule in Article 8); 
Anthony J. McMahon, Note, Differentiating Between Internal and External Gaps 
in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A 
Proposed Method for Determining "Governed By” in the Context of Article 7(2), 
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 992, 1027 (2006) (“[T]he parol evidence rule and the 
statute of frauds, though well entrenched in many common law countries, do not 
exist and are likely not to be understood in civil law countries.”). 
 112. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (1) (1977) (“A term fixing unreasonably large 
liquidated damages is void as a penalty.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981) (“A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated 
damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Aristides N. Hatzis, Civil Contract Law and Economic 
Reasoning—An Unlikely Pair?, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPEAN CODES AND 
CONTRACT LAW 181 (Stefan Grundmann & Martin Schauer eds., 2006) (arguing 
that the common law’s lack of penalty clauses is inefficient); Aristides N. Hatzis, 
Having the Cake and Eating It Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and 
Civil Contract Law, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381, 381-82 (2003) [hereinafter 
Efficient Penalty Clauses] (discussing the civil law versus common law with 
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between: (1) those who see the non-enforcement of penalty clauses 
as a facilitation of efficient breach and prevention of moral hazard 
problems, (2) those who argue that not enforcing such clauses 
undermines contracts as an allocation of risk mechanism, creates 
barriers to entry, and is antithetical to general economic theory,114 
and (3) those who would like to see a bifurcation of the concept of 
penalties into efficient and inefficient penalties.115 The common law 
has long seen penalties as a coercive means of ensuring 
performance—either perform or be punished. Under this rationale, 
the penalty violates the principle of compensatory damages that 
underlay common law remedies. 
The second approach noted above asserts that the common law 
needs to change and allow for the enforcement of penalties. This 
view argues that common law damages are under-compensatory, 
allowing the breaching party to obtain more than its fair share of the 
subsequent surplus.116 In addition, general economic theory holds 
that rational contracting parties will negotiate efficient contract 
terms. Therefore, the insertion of a penalty clause will likely be 
offset by a price adjustment. It also allows a contracting party to be 
more competitive by using the penalty clause as a signal of its 
reliability.117 Finally, the penalty clause assigns the risk of 
 
respect to enforcement of penalty clauses); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of 
Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 
633 (2001) (identifying possible issues regarding risk allocation stemming from a 
party’s inability to negotiate for the inclusion of enforceable penalty clauses). 
 114. See, e.g., Efficient Penalty Clauses, supra note 113, at 392 (stating 
economists’ critique of the common law penalty doctrine as inefficient because, 
among other things, it rejects allocation of risk by the parties and leads to 
inefficient breaches). 
 115. E.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties 
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Andrew Ham, The 
Rule Against Penalties in Contract: An Economic Perspective, 17 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 649 (1990); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and 
Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147 (1984). 
 116. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Penalties as Rational Response to Bargaining 
Irrationality, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 883, 909-10 (arguing that the common law 
of liquidated damages infringes on the freedom to contract and that penalty clauses 
merely reflect the real economic value of damages that the law fails to realize). 
 117.  But see id. at 892-95 (summarizing the outcome of a behavioral decision 
study, which found that volunteering to insert a penalty clause did not produce a 
statistically significant increase to the inserting party’s perceived reliability). 
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nonperformance to the most efficient insurer. These arguments view 
the use of penalty clauses as efficient deal-making devices and the 
failure to enforce them as an inequitable windfall to the breaching 
party.118 
Comparatively, commentators in the third camp—those who seek 
a bifurcation—essentially assert that the civil law correctly adopts a 
presumption in favor of the enforcement of penalty clauses. The 
presumption of enforceability can be overcome only if the penalty is 
determined to be manifestly or grossly excessive.119 A similar result 
would be achieved in American law if the rule against penalties was 
expunged and the problem of excessive penalties was policed under 
the doctrine of unconscionability.120 
The Council of Europe’s Resolution 78(3) on Penal Clauses 
adopts the civil approach that the penalty amount “may be reduced 
by the court when it is manifestly excessive.”121 Another 
amalgamation of civil and common law is the Principles of 
European Contract Law,122 which was a project envisioned by the 
Commission on European Contract Law to illuminate the common 
(and best) elements of the two legal systems. In the area of penalty 
clauses, the civil approach is understood as the better option—Article 
9.509(1) states that “the aggrieved party . . . shall be awarded that 
sum [penalty] irrespective of its actual loss.”123 The only limitation 
on the enforcement of penalty clauses is a reduction in the amount of 
the penalty if it is deemed to be “grossly excessive in relation to the 
loss resulting from the nonperformance and the other 
circumstances.”124 The Comment to Article 9.509 provides an 
 
 118. Cf. id. at 889 (arguing that “many penalty clauses are efficient and should 
be strictly enforced”). 
 119. See id. at 916-17 (asserting that the policing doctrines of unconscionability, 
duress, and misrepresentation are at once efficient and capable of protecting 
against manifestly excessive penalties). 
 120. See KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 94-95 (defining the doctrine of 
unconscionability as a tool to “protect against fraud, duress and incompetence, 
without demanding specific proof of any of them”). 
 121. Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Res. 78(3) on Penal Clauses in 
Civil Law, art. 7 (1978). 
 122. COMM’N OF EUR. CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT 
LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW]. 
 123. Id. at 453. 
 124. Id. 
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efficiency rationale for the rule: the parties want to avoid “the 
difficulty, delay and expense involved in proving the amount of loss 
in a claim for unliquidated damages.”125 The comparative efficiency 
analysis becomes more complicated when the differences among 
civil law systems are considered. Although most civil law systems 
limit the non-breaching party to the stipulated damages provided in 
the penalty clause, German law allows the non-breaching party to 
make a claim for damages in addition to the stipulated amount.126 
The latter approach defeats the efficiency gains attributed to the 
avoidance of litigation. The best rationale for this allowance is the 
case where the stipulated amount is set too low and is, thus, under-
compensatory. 
To summarize, the common law holds that all penalty clauses are 
unenforceable and provides a void-only remedy. The civil law holds 
that mutually agreed upon penalties are fully enforceable unless they 
are deemed to be excessive. Further, the civil law encourages courts 
to reform the clause instead of voiding it. General economic theory 
argues that the law is most efficient when enforcing express terms 
because the contracting parties are in the best position to determine 
the valuation of such terms.127 The argument here against efficient 
breach theory is that not all breaches are efficient.128 In practice, it is 
rather difficult to determine if a breach is efficient since a sine qua 
non requirement for the efficiency of the breach is full compensation 
to the promisee, and it is difficult for the courts to determine what 
constitutes “full compensation” in a given case because subjective 
valuations are difficult to measure or quantify. In contrast, a penalty 
clause gives a clear indication of the value that the promisee places 
on the performance; the fee paid for such clauses can be invested by 
the likely breaching party to ensure timely performance, and 
penalties protect sunk costs.129 
 
 125. Id. at 454. 
 126. Id. at 455 n.2. 
 127. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the efficiency gains generated by deferring 
to individual autonomy). 
 128. See Macneil, supra note 69, at 950-53 (positing that when contract 
nonperformance is the most efficient result, breach is but one of many ways to 
achieve that result). 
 129. See DiMatteo, supra note 116, at 902 (noting that subjective valuations, 
like liquidated damages, are subject to the “limits of cognition”); Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 
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Unfortunately, the CISG abdicated its coverage of this contentious 
area of law by not enacting rules dealing with the enforceability of 
liquidated damages or penalties. The result is the allocation of the 
issue to conflicting national laws.130 In the case of the common law, 
it means delegation to a hopelessly conflictive and chaotic 
jurisprudence.131 In such areas as penalties and specific performance, 
the CISG missed the opportunity to harmonize conflicting areas of 
law.132 As a result, from the perspective of global efficiency, the 
CISG is less efficient then it could be.  
 B. EVIDENTIARY RULES 
 The negotiators of the CISG faced what seemed to be an 
insurmountable conflict between those countries preferring the 
formal requirement of writing and those recognizing the full 
enforceability of oral agreements or less formal writings.133 Civil law 
countries fall into the latter category,134 and while the United 
Kingdom disposed of the statute of frauds,135 it remains a 
requirement in the United States for a number of categories of 
contracts, including the sale of goods.136 The CISG adopted the civil 
law approach of no writing requirement with one important 
 
108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 644 (2010) (explaining that penalty clauses are a means of 
facilitating efficient agreements and reflect the parties’ judgments as to a 
cost/benefit analysis of the bargain). 
 130. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 109 (suggesting the use of the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts to fill the gap left by the CISG). 
 131. See DiMatteo, supra note 113, at 655-75 (attributing this chaos to the 
common law’s preoccupation with balancing freedom of contract principles with 
the equities of each case). 
 132. See Peter A. Piliounis, The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price 
Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) Under the CISG: Are These 
Worthwhile Changes or Additions to English Sales Law?, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 
17-19 (2000) (arguing that the CISG missed the opportunity to broaden instances 
where specific performance is granted, and pointing out that the PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 122, include one such broader specific 
performance provision requiring a court to award specific performance unless on 
of the enumerated exceptions are met). 
 133. Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of 
International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 460-61 (2005). 
 134. McMahon, supra note 111, at 1027. 
 135. Asa Markel, American, English, and Japanese Warranty Law Compared: 
Should the U.S. Reconsider Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 163, 190 n.170 (2009). 
 136. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977). 
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compromise. The compromise allows countries to opt out of the no 
writing requirement when ratifying the convention.137 As a result, a 
number of countries, mostly former Soviet-affiliated countries, 
retained their national writing requirements.138 Interestingly, the 
United States elected not to opt out of the no writing rule.139 
1. Writing Requirement 
 Before analyzing the efficiency of requiring a written 
instrument as a prerequisite for contract enforceability, a comment 
regarding the “opt out” provisions of Articles 12 and 96 is needed. A 
system that allows for such opting out is inherently inefficient.140 The 
presence of alternative, conflicting rules in any law increases 
uncertainty and transaction costs. To allow an affirmative defense in 
a contract dispute based on a failure to provide a written instrument 
adds to the uncertainty of international transactions. Where a custom 
of oral agreement, honored internationally, is trumped by the 
 
 137. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 12, 96. 
 138. See Status: 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, U.N. COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.ht
ml (listing the following countries as opting out of the no writing rule: Argentina, 
Armenia, Chile, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Paraguay). 
 139. Id. (indicating that the U.S. instead exercised its Article 95 rights to declare 
that it is not bound by paragraph 1(b) of Article 1). The U.S.’s accession to Article 
12 illustrates the difference between formal and operative rules. Despite the 
U.C.C.’s retention of a writing requirement in practice, it has been greatly 
diminished by the lessening of the threshold for “writing” and “signature,” and the 
existence of numerous exceptions, such as the written confirmation rule and 
purchases of specially manufactured goods. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The CISG and 
the Presumption of Enforceability: Unintended Contractual Liability in 
International Business Dealings, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 166-67 (1997) 
(discussing the rigidness of the U.C.C.’s statute of frauds with respect to oral 
agreements and informal letter agreements, but also acknowledging exceptions to 
the rule). These differences of formal law and law in practice, and the narrowing of 
evidentiary thresholds, provide insight into the possible inefficiencies of such 
formalities. 
 140. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 133, at 454 (arguing that the ability to opt-
out of certain provisions of uniform international sales law undermines the benefits 
of the standardization as it allows the parties to draft their own party-specific 
provisions); Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in 
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (arguing that the 
poor degree of harmonization in the CISG makes it of limited benefit to 
contracting parties). 
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parochial formality requirements of national legal systems, the 
efficiency gains attributed to a uniform system of rules are 
diminished.141 
There are contrasting views of the efficiency of the writing 
requirement. Some argue that requiring a writing promotes 
transactional certainty and consequently reduces dispute resolution 
costs.142 Allowing oral testimony to establish a contract creates a 
moral hazard, as parties are incentivized to fabricate obligations 
where none were intended.143 However, when the parties believe that 
a writing is not necessary, a legal regime’s requirement of a writing 
increases transaction costs.144 Sometimes the negotiation and drafting 
costs of placing a contract in writing exceed the benefits from 
entering the contract and a mutually beneficial trade is forgone.145 In 
addition, by requiring a writing, an opportunistic party may seek to 
nullify a bona fide oral agreement and escape a contractual 
obligation.146 
Economic critique of the writing requirement ultimately depends 
on whether the benefits of requiring a writing—reducing fraudulent 
allegations of oral contracts—exceed the costs—increased drafting 
expense and propensity to nullify bone fide transactions. Enforcing a 
 
 141. Cf. Gillette & Scott, supra note 133, at 452-53 (asserting that because states 
have different social, political, and legal structures, it is “entirely unrealistic” to 
expect uniform rules and that over time litigation within such states will yield non-
uniform interpretations as to certain provisions, resulting in a failed standard 
language). 
 142. See, e.g., KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 60, at 94-95 (noting that the 
statute of frauds and parol evidence rules serve a legitimate end in controlling and 
preventing fraud by limiting instances where an undeserving party may win in a 
dispute). 
 143. E.g., Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A 
Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1976-77 (1996). 
 144. Id. at 1977-78. Eric Posner describes two expensive outcomes that may 
occur as a result of parties being unaware of the statute of frauds, codified in 
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C.—either (1) “courts may enforce section 2-201 and 
allow promisors to escape their contract obligations” or (2) “courts may strain to 
evade section 2-201, thus holding promisors to their bargain, but in the process 
creating complexity and uncertainty in the law.” Id. 
 145. Id. at 1979. 
 146. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and 
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 518-19 (1987) (providing 
commentary that criticizes the writing requirement as promoting, rather than 
discouraging, opportunistic conduct). 
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false allegation of an oral contract violates freedom from contract, 
while failing to enforce a legitimate exchange, violates freedom to 
contract.147 In accord with this logic, the civil law entrusts courts to 
ferret out bogus claims of oral contracts, while preserving the 
efficiency of permitting parties to transact without prior written 
documentation.148 The CISG follows this rule as well.149 
2. Parol Evidence Rule 
Just as important as the issue of whether to require a writing is the 
issue of whether a writing limits the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence to supplement or contradict the written instrument. Civil 
law countries, like France, do not make a distinction between oral 
and written contracts with regard to the admissibility of extrinsic 
information.150 Generally, extrinsic evidence is freely admitted in the 
interpretation of contracts. In contrast, the common law, especially in 
the United States, relates the integration of an agreement into a 
written contract to the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence. The 
rationale of the sanctity of a written contract is protected by the 
common law’s parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds.151 The 
parol evidence rule holds that if a writing was intended as a final 
integration of an agreement, whether or not a writing is required 
under the statute of frauds, extrinsic evidence is barred if it would 
 
 147. Numerous law and economic commentators tend to favor the civil law rule 
dispensing with the need for a writing. See, e.g., Michael Braunstein, Remedy, 
Reason, and the Statute of Frauds: A Critical Economic Analysis, 1989 UTAH L. 
REV. 383, 422-38 (1989) (arguing for a repeal of both the writing requirement and 
the statute of frauds because they tend to hamper economic efficiency); Mark 
Cantora, Note, The CISG After Medellin v. Texas: Do U.S. Businesses Have It? Do 
They Want It?, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 127 (2009) (“The statute of frauds as used 
in the U.C.C. is at best superfluous, and at worst, an inefficient default rule.”). 
 148.  See Wiseman, supra note 146, at 519 (discussing the modification of 
earlier versions of the statute of frauds by Karl Llewellyn, who added the 
“merchant rule” to accommodate the traditional practice of merchants confirming 
deals over the phone and not necessarily in writing). 
 149. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 (“A contract of sale need not be concluded 
in or evidenced by writing . . . .”). 
 150. Stefan Vogenauer, Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative 
Observations, in CONTRACT TERMS 123, 135 (Andrew Burrows & Edwin Peel 
eds., 2007) (indicating that both Germany and France do not place limits on the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence). 
 151. Id. at 135-39. 
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contradict the plain meaning of the written agreement.152 In reality, 
American courts often avoid the parol evidence bar by declaring 
contract language to be ambiguous and therefore, parol evidence is 
admitted to clarify, but not to contradict the contract.153 The CISG 
rejects any limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence.154 The 
question relevant to the current undertaking is whether the CISG’s 
rejection of a writing requirement and restrictions on extrinsic 
evidence were efficient choices. 
 EAL scholarship supports the certainty provided by written 
agreements and the plain meaning interpretation of them. The 
protection of written agreements through a rigid parol evidence rule 
is seen as enhancing the certainty of written agreements.155 However, 
the certainty protection provided by the parol evidence rule is 
partially muted by the fact that there are different versions of the 
rule.156 Professor Linzer explains the variations: 
 
 152. E.g., Hila Keren, Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of 
the Parol Evidence Rule with Gender in Mind, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & 
L. 251, 251 (2005). The common law's parol evidence rule dates back four hundred 
years, and under the rule, prior inconsistent writings or witness testimony 
regarding contract negotiations constitutes inadmissible evidence when there is an 
integrated contract or where the issue relates to the written terms of a partially 
integrated contract. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L. J. 603, 
603 (1944). One commentator argues that Lord Coke’s reason for formulating the 
rule was his pro-market orientation: “Coke seemed interested in the contractual 
tool itself, the one used by purchasers and farmers. The danger he visualized was 
in all likelihood the danger of chaos—of never-ending clashes and contradictions 
between written contracts and oral promises, between legal texts and the human 
contexts that threaten to change their meaning.” Keren, supra. 
 153. See Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 138 (making the distinction between 
admissibility and weight in contract breach cases and stressing that although 
extrinsic evidence may be admissible, it does not follow that it will be controlling). 
 154. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8 (allowing in contract interpretation an 
analysis of intent and conduct of the parties, with due consideration for all 
circumstances of the contract, including negotiations, practice between the parties, 
and industry usages and standards). 
 155. See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol 
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 802 (2002) (asserting that a “strict parol 
evidence rule combined with a strong view of plain meaning” provides predictive 
stability and comfort). 
 156. See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A 
Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 
167-69 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (noting the common law’s 
general preference for textualism despite the U.C.C.’s and Second Restatement of 
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What we call the parol evidence rule is better thought of as a spectrum. 
Some courts, old and new, presume that almost all documents, however 
skimpy or haphazard, represent the final word. Others will not go that far, 
but still apply Williston’s famous “four corners rule” strictly, rejecting 
extrinsic evidence unless questions of integration and ambiguity of 
meaning are patent on the face of the writing. Other courts, although they 
recite the four corners approach, actually require the facial uncertainty to 
be much less palpable, and admit extrinsic evidence more readily. Still 
others allow extrinsic evidence to show non-integration and ambiguity 
themselves, and some even go as far as the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts and admit evidence to show meaning without regard to 
ambiguity.157 
In some instances, the parol evidence rule may be “hard” for 
purposes of determining the completeness of the written contract and 
“soft” for determining whether an ambiguity exists in the contract.158 
A purely formalist interpretive methodology focused on the four-
corners of a writing blunts efforts to uncover the true intention of the 
parties.159 EAL holds that the parties are the best evaluators of value 
and preferences.160 As such, extrinsic evidence that offers insight into 
the parties’ true intentions provides the most efficient interpretation 
of contractual terms. 
 
Contracts’ codification of contextual interpretation). 
 157. Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-06 (citations omitted). Linzer further notes 
that “Eric Posner, after sketching out what he called the ‘hard-[parol evidence 
rule]’ (roughly the Williston, four-corners, plain meaning approach) and the ‘soft-
[parol evidence rule]’ (roughly that of Corbin and the Second Restatement of 
Contracts), cautioned his readers that . . . ‘reality is [far] more complex than the 
stylized versions of the parol evidence rule developed for the purpose of 
analysis.’” Id. at 807 (quoting Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain 
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 533, 534-40 (1998)). 
 158. See Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-07 (offering an enumerated 
characterization of the spectrum, moving from most restrictive to more liberal 
regimes: (1) document regarded as a final integration (legal formalism); (2) “four 
corners rule” with patent ambiguity exception (Williston); (3) broader 
interpretation of what constitutes ambiguity; (4) liberal use of extrinsic evidence to 
show ambiguity or non-integration; and (5) use of extrinsic evidence to uncover 
meaning even without ambiguity (contextualism)). 
 159. See id. at 838-39 (explaining that the formalist approach does not consider 
context, credibility, linguistic sensibility, and many other contextual factors 
relevant to discerning intent). 
 160. See id. at 838 (“[W]e should opt for the parties’ intentions, discerned from 
their words, read in the context of all relevant evidence, extrinsic or not.”). 
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 The CISG rejects the common law’s parol evidence rule.161 
The CISG evidence regime provides for the liberal admission of 
parol and other types of extrinsic evidence as well as allows the use 
of “vague” or open forms of contracting.162 Professor Triantis argued 
that vagueness in written contracts can serve certain economic 
purposes such as lowering transaction costs by lowering the costs of 
negotiation and the writing of contracts.163 Judge Posner also 
acknowledged the benefits of a certain degree of vagueness in 
written contracts.164 He writes, “[d]eliberate ambiguity may be a 
necessary condition of making the contract; the parties may be 
unable to agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances 
on being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention, 
should the need arise.”165 In the end, Judge Posner speaks in favor of 
a modified “four corners” rule that “allow[s] extrinsic ambiguity to 
 
 161. Rod N. Andreason, Note, MCC-Marble Ceramic Center: The Parol 
Evidence Rule and Other Domestic Law Under the Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, 1999 BYU L. REV. 350, 357-64. It is debated as to 
whether the parol evidence rule is a rule of civil procedure, and thus American 
courts may use it in applying the CISG, or a rule of substantive contract law. The 
better argument is that it is the latter and thus cannot be used in the application of 
the CISG. See id. at 357-59 (quoting MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramic Nuova 
d’ Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (11th Cir. 1998)) (reasoning that the 
parol evidence rule is substantive because it does not stop parties from using an 
“undesirable” means to prove a fact, but instead stops parties from attempting to 
prove a fact in the first place). 
 162. But cf. George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A 
Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory of U.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 
1067 (2002) (expressing confusion over parties’ willingness to agree to vague 
terms because such vague standards of contracting create uncertainty and risk the 
high cost of judicial interpretation). 
 163. See id. at 1071 (stating that the cost of taking the time and energy to specify 
each possible foreseeable future state of the world has the potential to exceed the 
gains from doing so). 
 164. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1587 (2005) (indentifying a benefit of having flexible 
contractual language—it allows for adaptability of the language to future 
unforeseen situations—but also noting that the cost of such flexibility is 
vagueness). Additionally, gap-filling, under the CISG and U.C.C., for material 
terms such as price may be cost effective because of the fungible nature of goods 
and the relative ease of determining market price, whereas such gap filling may be 
too burdensome for other types of terms. See id. at 1587-88 (suggesting, however, 
that the cost saving would not be significant—and the burden shouldered by a 
court in determining a “reasonable price” might be prohibitive). 
 165. Id. at 1583. 
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be shown only by objective evidence.”166 Evidence of custom or 
trade usage is an example of objective evidence.167  
 In sum, the use of economic logic to assess the parol evidence 
rule is highly nuanced. Common law courts use the rule to protect 
the integrity of integrated writings, while simultaneously permitting 
extrinsic evidence to explain ambiguities.168 By contrast, most civil 
law systems and the CISG allow parol evidence, trusting the courts 
to assess its probative value.169 While economic theory generally 
supports the common law approach, the distinction between the 
common law and civil law approaches to extrinsic evidence should 
not be over-stated. Given the numerous exceptions to the rule, the 
two systems often reach the same results. The use of extrinsic 
evidence will be further studied in the next section’s coverage of 
contract interpretation. 
C. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 
 Judge Posner notes that although the literature involving the 
economic analysis of contract law is deep in the areas of contract 
formation and remedies, the economic analysis of contract 
interpretation is more superficial and abstract.170 Nonetheless, he 
asserts that contract interpretation is better managed through an 
economic analysis.171 
Contract interpretation deals with three fundamental scenarios: (1) 
contractual incompleteness, (2) contractual ambiguity, and (3) 
situations in which the parties seek ex ante to establish rules of 
 
 166. Id. at 1598. Posner further clarifies that, “[b]y ‘objective,’ I mean to 
exclude a party's self-serving testimony that cannot be verified . . . .” Id. at 1598-
99. 
 167. See id. at 1600 (“Were evidence of trade usage barred in contract litigation, 
parties to contracts would be driven to include additional detail in their contracts . . 
. . The need to add this detail would increase the costs of negotiation and drafting, 
while the benefits would be realized only in the small minority of cases that would 
result in a legal dispute.”). 
 168. See generally Linzer, supra note 155, at 805-08. 
 169. See supra Part II.B.2; CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3) (indicating that 
consideration should be given to relevant circumstances surrounding the formation 
of the contract—such as negotiations, practices between the parties, and customary 
usages—when interpreting a contract). 
 170. Posner, supra note 164, at 1581. 
 171. See id. (“I shall try to show that economics can be of considerable help in 
understanding the problems involved in interpreting contracts.”). 
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interpretation that will apply ex post.172 Before discussing these 
scenarios, the next subsection will address the more abstract question 
of the efficiency of the objective and subjective theories of contract 
interpretation. 
 1. Objective Versus Subjective Theories of Interpretation 
 The two broad theories of contract interpretation are illustrated 
by the civil law’s adoption of a subjective (agreement in fact) 
approach and the common law’s embrace of the objective (external 
manifestation of assent) approach.173 Article 1156 of the Code Civile 
of 1804, as well as Section 133 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 
1900, require a search for “the common intention of the contracting 
parties.”174 
The divergence between subjective and objective theories of 
interpretation is not as profound in practice.175 The subjective theory 
in the civil law gives way when the objective meaning is clear and 
the subjective obscure. Thus, Articles 1157 through 1164 of the Code 
Civile acknowledge that the path to subjective understanding is 
through more objective benchmarks, such as the nature or purpose of 
the contract, trade usage and custom, and “the context of the 
contractual document.”176 The German law more expressly abandons 
subjectivism in favor of the reasonable person interpretive 
methodology.177 The CISG adopts a modified subjective approach.178 
The CISG interpretive methodology, as expressed in its Articles 8 
and 9, rejects the formalist approach to interpretation associated with 
the brand of objectivism that focuses solely on the written words of a 
 
 172. See infra Parts II.C.2-3. 
 173. See Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 125 (stating that the objective and 
subjective distinction in the context of interpretation speaks to the will or intention 
of the parties). 
 174. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1156 (Fr.); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil 
Code], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] at 42, as amended, § 133 
(Ger). 
 175. See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 95, at 45-50. 
 176. Vogenauer, supra note 150, at 126. 
 177. See id. at 139 (discussing the reasonable person as one of two balancing 
factors which make up the “theory of indication” under German law). 
 178. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text; see also CISG, supra note 
1, art. 29(1) (“A contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of 
the parties.”). 
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contract.179 In the common law, this approach is embedded in the 
duty to read, the four-corners rule, the parol evidence rule, and the 
plain meaning rule of interpretation.180 If intent is associated with the 
meaning of the parties’ written agreement, then the EAL would 
assert that such rules protect the autonomy or will of private parties. 
However, true intent is most likely to be made available only through 
a contextual analysis of meaning. The uncovering of “true” intent 
better protects the principal of private autonomy that underlies 
contract law.181 The CISG interpretive methodology is best 
understood as embracing the objective theory of contract 
interpretation through a full contextual inquiry. This is made clear 
given the following interpretative framework provided in CISG 
Articles 8 and 9: 
• Statements and conduct “are to be interpreted according to 
the understanding [of] a reasonable person.”182 
• In applying the reasonable person standard, “due 
consideration is to be given to all relevant 
circumstances . . . including the negotiations, any practices 
which the parties have established between themselves, 
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”183 
• “The parties are considered . . . to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract . . . a usage” widely known in 
international trade.184 
The major exception to this objectivist framework is the inter-
subjectivist methodology found in Article 8(1), mandating that a 
party is bound to another party’s subjective intent “where the other 
party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent was.”185 
 
 179. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8-9 (indicating that the usages, practices, 
statements, and conduct of the parties are considered in contract interpretation). 
 180. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in 
Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 767 (2002) (stating that the statute of 
frauds, coupled with these three aformentioned theories, meant that in classical 
contract law the written document drafted by the parties usually ruled). 
 181. See DiMatteo, supra note 116, at 902-03 (explaining that autonomy is 
central to contract law and suggesting the use of implicit and explicit consent-
based factors to determine the enforceability of penalty clauses). 
 182. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2). 
 183. Id. art. 8(3). 
 184. Id. art. 9(2). 
 185. Id. art. 8(1). See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 95, at 49-50. 
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Under this perspective, the objective meaning of a promise is 
trumped by the known idiosyncratic, subjective meaning of the 
promise-receiving party. An illustration can be taken from the 
common law’s unilateral mistake doctrine. Generally, a reasonable 
person interpretation of a contract term will prevail over the mistaken 
unilateral interpretation of one of the parties.186 However, the 
unilateral mistake doctrine provides relief if the subjective error was 
known or could not have been unknown to the non-mistaken party at 
the time of contract formation.187 
 2. Intentional Contractual Incompleteness 
 There are three rationales for intentional contractual 
incompleteness: (1) avoiding the transaction costs of negotiating a 
more complete contract, (2) strategic informational asymmetry, and 
(3) consensual strategic incompleteness. Judge Posner refers to these 
types of incompleteness as “deliberate ambiguity.”188 One of the 
rationales for intentional incompleteness is that such ambiguity is “a 
necessary condition of making the contract.”189 From an efficiency 
perspective, such an ambiguity is rational when the cost of clarifying 
or adding a term is greater than the benefit of having a more 
complete contract. The costs are likely to outweigh the benefits of 
completeness where there is a low probability of the event that the 
term deals with will occur.190 The more efficient strategy would be to 
keep the term open for future negotiation.191 Since the overwhelming 
majority of transactions do not result in costly dispute resolution 
proceedings, it is often efficient to avoid negotiation of a given 
 
 186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(c) (1981) (stating that a 
party bears the risk of a mistake when “the risk is allocated to him by the court on 
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so”). 
 187. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes, [1871] 6 L.R.Q.B. 597, 610-11 (U.K.) (stating 
that a buyer is relieved of his obligation to buy a product if the seller believed that 
the buyer was mistaken as to the nature of the actual product and if the buyer 
actually was so mistaken). 
 188. Posner, supra note 164, at 1583. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. (stating parties may make a decision to delegate to the courts 
completion of the contract as to a contingency, should it materialize, for 
negotiation cost reasons). 
 191. See Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional 
Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169, 173-74 (2005) (noting that this is 
possible because the law allows for the modification of contracts). 
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term.192 The costs of such negotiation outweigh the costs of resolving 
a dispute over the term in litigation or arbitration due to the low 
probability of such an occurrence.193 So often the gaps and vagueness 
found in contracts are the conscious choices of the contracting 
parties. 
Strategic informational asymmetry occurs when a party decides to 
strategically withhold information in order to avoid less beneficial 
terms that would result by the disclosure of the information. One 
suggested response is for the courts to fill in the gap with a “penalty 
default” term that punishes the non-disclosing party.194 The literature 
on disclosure in contract law balances the need to protect individual 
autonomy by not requiring disclosure against the fairness of 
requiring the disclosure of at least material information. Although the 
CISG failed to adopt mandatory disclosure rules, its inter-subjective 
interpretive methodology does place pressure on the information 
holder to disclose in order to subsequently prove contractual 
assent.195 
The case of consensual strategic incompleteness exists where both 
parties suffer from a lack of full information. This lack of full 
information often revolves around the transactional uncertainty of 
predicting future events in a long-term contract.196 The parties may 
 
 192. See id. at 175 (identifying in particular the high cost of attorney fees that 
would result from extensive negotiation). 
 193. See id. (making the point that for financial purposes, parties may be willing 
to risk contractual failure, even if such failure results in litigation). 
 194. See id. (noting, however, that such a penalty would work only if the value 
of the information is rather modest compared to the penalty); see also Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (stating that penalty defaults “are 
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around 
the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision that 
they prefer”). The Ayres-Gertner Model distinguishes between default terms that 
can be altered by agreement of the parties and immutable contract terms that 
cannot be altered. Id. at 87. Most default terms, known as “majoritarian” defaults, 
seek to mimic the terms that the parties would have agreed to if they had address 
them. Id. at 93. By contrast, a “penalty default” provides a term that the parties do 
not want; hence, they are incentivized to affirmatively address the issue so as to 
avoid the unwanted term. Id. at 91. 
 195. This paper will discuss this notion under the topic of “particularized 
consent.” See infra Part III. 
 196. Cf. Katz, supra note 191, at 175 (discussing contract incompleteness as 
potentially caused by the relatively low probability of an event coming to fruition). 
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agree to an open term with the aim of renegotiating the issue in the 
event of a post-formation development.197 Another reason for such 
consensual ambiguity is the avoidance of the risk that negotiation 
over a particular term will lead to a deal-preventing impasse. The 
agreement to an open term or gap in the contract is likely to be 
strategic in nature because each party will work to frame the future 
renegotiation in its favor. Unintentional openness, which will be 
discussed in the next section’s coverage of contractual ambiguity, 
provides a comparison to consensual ambiguity.  
A similar case of strategic incompleteness in both long-term and 
short-term contracts is related to self-enforcing market mechanisms, 
such as reputation.198 In consumer contracts, the consumer expects 
that a major corporation in a competitive market will agree to a fair 
settlement of any problem created by a low-probability event. This 
type of trust boosts the corporation’s reputation (which is very 
valuable in a competitive market in which there is little price 
competition).199 Greater sales and the reduction in transaction costs 
supersede the costs from moral hazard incentives because of 
consensual strategic incompleteness. The same holds for long-term 
contracts. The parties decide not to regulate their relationship ex ante 
since they know that for any low-probability event it will be more 
efficient to modify the contract ex post, avoiding the drafting costs 
and the possible relation-stressing effects of prolonged bargaining.200 
 
 197. Id. at 169. Economists and legal scholars use the term “incomplete 
contracting” differently to refer to either obligational incompleteness or contingent 
incompleteness. Legal scholars utilize the prior term, which refers to “contracts in 
which the obligations are not fully specified.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 
YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992). Economists use the latter term, which refers to a failure 
to “fully realize the potential gains from trade.” Id. With this understanding, 
obligational incompleteness can be used strategically to more fully capture 
potential gains as events unfold. 
 198. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY 
INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 71 (1980). 
 199. Ostas, supra note 103, at 546-48. 
 200. Cf. Katz, supra note 191, at 175 (indicating that sometimes parties decide 
to skip the negotiation of some terms pre-contract due after performing a cost 
benefit analysis). Additionally, the economic significance of “trust” and 
“confidence” plays a prominent role in the socio-economic approach to 
contracting. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW 
ECONOMICS 10 (1988) (explaining that trust arises out of “previous transactions 
based on rational calculations and efficient ‘rules of thumb’”). 
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 The problem of filling in gaps in written contracts has been the 
subject of much EAL literature. This literature is not concerned with 
contract interpretation per se, but instead focuses on the issue of 
incomplete contracts, generally discussing the issue of the fabrication 
and selection of default rules.201 Defaults can be either immutable or 
subject to modification by the parties.202 Given our first tenet—
deference to individual autonomy, economic reasoning suggests that 
defaults should be structured so that the parties can easily tailor them 
to their own needs.203 In addition, there is a general consensus that 
defaults will reduce transaction costs if they mimic what the parties 
themselves would have chosen if they had addressed the term in their 
contract.204 Judge Posner notes that the parliaments of Germany and 
other nations of Continental Europe have enacted detailed codes of 
“contractual obligations, constituting implied terms that the parties 
can, however, negate.”205 A similar pattern is found in the CISG, 
which provides a host of gap fillers, most of which can be modified 
by express agreement of the parties. 
 
 201. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 197 (theorizing as to how courts 
and legislatures should handle default rules efficiently from an economic 
perspective). 
 202. Id. at 87-91. 
 203. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 594 (arguing that if default rules 
are constructed inefficiently then contracting parties will write contracts to avoid 
them, which increases transaction costs). Generally, legislatures do not possess 
adequate knowledge of the costs and benefits to contracting parties necessary for 
drafting efficient problem-solving default rules. Ian Ayers, Default Rules for 
Incomplete Contracts, in 1 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 585, 279-80 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 204. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277, 586 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
(commenting that the parties would have organically included such defaults if they 
could “costlessly contract”). Such rules are often referred to as “majoritarian” 
defaults. Id.; see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1433 (1989) (arguing that default terms should 
be what the parties would chose given “full information and costless contracting”). 
See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation 
in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 
713, 733-36 (1997) (suggesting that in situations where network externalities 
prevent parties from choosing optimal individual terms, default terms should be 
centrally chosen for their substantive efficiency). For an alternate approach to 
contract interpretation, see generally Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form 
and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004) 
(advocating a transactional approach to the problem of contract interpretation). 
 205. Posner, supra note 164, at 1586. 
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 3. Contractual Ambiguity 
 The most common forms of ambiguity, unlike those discussed 
in the previous section, are those that are unintended. Professor 
Linzer’s critique of a formalist interpretation of written contracts 
notes that the “flaw in plain meaning is, of course, the notion of a 
latent ambiguity.”206 In the plain meaning and four-corners analysis, 
extrinsic evidence can only be introduced in cases of patent 
ambiguity.207 Justice Traynor, in his Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.208 decision reviewing the parol 
evidence rule, said the following regarding the determination of 
ambiguity:  
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a 
written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and 
unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to 
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably 
susceptible.209 
This idea of an alternative reasonable latent meaning supports a 
more contextual interpretive methodology. It asserts that one can 
rarely reach the threshold of sufficient clarity of written words 
without viewing the context behind the usage.210 Thus, seemingly 
clear contract language may be susceptible to an alternative (non-
plain meaning) interpretation through the use of extrinsic evidence. 
 The objective approach, stripped of the formal requirements of 
a writing and the parol evidence rule, allows for a fuller contextual 
inquiry. It is this contextualism that the CISG embraces in order to 
uncover the true intent of the contracting parties. The formalist or 
textualist approach holds that bright-line rules such as the statute of 
frauds, plain meaning rule, four-corner analysis, and parol evidence 
rule provide greater certainty, and thus reduce transaction costs.211 
 
 206. Linzer, supra note 155, at 803. 
 207. See id. at 820-23 (offering an example of a case in which a patent 
ambiguity existed in the agreement between the parties, which led to the 
admissibility of parol evidence). 
 208. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
 209. Id. at 644. 
 210. See id. (explaining that a contract cannot be limited to the four corners of 
the document, as this would ignore the intent as well as “presuppose a degree of 
verbal precision and stability” not actually found in our language). 
 211. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
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The contextualist approach asserts that written words are generally 
indeterminate and a totality of the circumstances analysis is required 
to uncover true intent.212 Furthermore, the so-called bright-line rules 
of formalism are not very fixed or bright given that extrinsic 
evidence is allowed to supplement but not contradict a written 
contract.213 For example, the determination of ambiguity is left to 
judicial discretion.214 This discretion can be used to “find” an 
ambiguity and allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence in cases 
where exclusion would work an injustice. 
The majority of EAL literature supports the formalist approach to 
contract interpretation.215 Schwartz and Scott argue in favor of the 
formal interpretation of written contracts in business to business 
contracts.216 This formal approach includes plain meaning 
interpretation, a hard parol evidence rule, and full enforcement of 
merger clauses.217 Such an approach is viewed as promoting 
efficiency given the sophistication of businesspersons and their 
ability to negotiate efficient contracts. In these cases, even where 
there is a long-term relationship, the inclusion of a merger clause in a 
 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1724, 1735-44 (2001) (arguing that within the formal operation of the cotton 
industry’s private legal system, bright-line rules reduce transaction costs and 
makes misunderstandings less likely). 
 212. See Miriam R. Albert, Common Sense for Common Stock Options: 
Inconsistent Interpretation of Anti-Dilution Provisions in Options and Warrants, 
34 RUTGERS L.J. 321, 331 (noting that this necessarily involves extrinsic 
evidence). 
 213. See Linzer, supra note 155, at 804-08 (asserting that even courts using a 
formalist approach apply the rules differently and adopt many exceptions to allow 
for the admission of extrinsic evidence). 
 214. See id. at 807 (“[I]nstead of a parol evidence ‘rule,’ there is a continuum of 
many different approaches, all using the same name and often using the same 
words.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: 
Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 115 (focusing on the virtues 
of the formalist approach, such as “bright-line rules, objective interpretation, and 
party autonomy”); see also David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999) (indicating that formalist lawyers attempt to deduce 
contract rules from an “essentialist understanding of the nature of promise and 
consent”). 
 216. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 547, 618 (stating that firms want 
courts to enforce the contracts that the parties themselves write and not what a 
decision maker with a concern for fairness would write). 
 217. Id. at 547. 
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contract signifies the genuine consent of the parties on the 
enforcement of their contract without having to worry about judicial 
discretion.218 The probability of such a clause being included in the 
contract without the will of one of the parties is minimal, thus a 
strong parol evidence rule seems efficient. 
The anti-formalists argue that the efficiency gains in formalism are 
overstated.219 In fact, there are efficiency costs related to a strong 
parol evidence rule and formalistic interpretation of contracts. Avery 
Katz argues that such an approach “can encourage parties to expend 
extra resources in negotiation, on one hand by attempting to 
manipulate the formal text of the agreement in their favor, and on the 
other hand by attempting to prevent the counterparty from doing 
so.”220 This approach replaces efficient negotiators with inefficient 
lawyer-drafters, leading to an increase in transaction costs that is not 
counterbalanced by the parallel reduction in administration (court) 
costs due to the fact that only a small fraction of contracts end up in 
court.221 
The U.C.C., despite its adoption of a statute of frauds requirement, 
rejects the plain meaning approach in favor of a totality of 
circumstances analysis.222 It further rejects the formality of the 
promise-based will theory in favor of an agreement-in-fact 
approach.223 The agreement-in-fact approach requires the use of 
contextual evidence to determine the parties’ true intent.224 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Katz, supra note 191, at 179-80 (indicting that formalistic regimes can 
introduce unnecessary risk and higher costs). 
 220. Id. at 180. 
 221. See id. (noting that sales and purchasing agents are better placed to promote 
overall organizational interests than their lawyers and other drafting agents). 
 222. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1977) (stating that the terms of a written agreement 
may be supplemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of 
performance). For a more complete explanation of the “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis, particularly with regard to the reasonable person 
benchmark, see DiMatteo, supra note 96, at 317-25. 
 223. See U.C.C. §1-201(3) (1977) (‘“Agreement' . . . means the bargain of the 
parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, 
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided 
in Section 1-303.”). 
 224. Cf. Steven A. McCloskey, North Carolina Employment Case Law: 
Contract Principles Abandoned, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 163, 170 (2003) (quoting 
Snyder v. Freeman, 266 S.E.2d 593, 602 (N.C. 1980)) (noting that an agreement in 
fact is one based upon circumstances showing a mutual intent of the parties). 
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 The differences between the evidentiary thresholds for 
admitting extrinsic evidence under the CISG and the U.C.C. are not 
as great as the formal rules indicate. The main difference is that the 
U.C.C. orders the probative value of the evidence. Section 1-303(e) 
states that when conflictive, the written agreement prevails over 
extrinsic evidence, course of performance prevails over evidence of 
prior dealings and trade usage, and prior dealings prevail over trade 
usage.225 In contrast, under the CISG, the judge or arbitrator 
determines the probative value of the different types of evidence on a 
case-by-case basis.226 
The ordering/non-ordering distinction is also overblown. The civil 
law systems generally hold that the written contract is most probative 
even though there are no formal constraints on the use of extrinsic 
evidence.227 Also, despite the U.C.C. ordering rule, a judge applying 
this rule remains free to determine if the contract language is 
ambiguous. If the judge determines that it is ambiguous, then 
extrinsic evidence can be admitted, as demonstrated in Nanakuli 
Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., Inc.228 The case involved a 
contract for the long-term supply of asphalt products which expressly 
granted the supplier the right to post the price at the time of 
delivery.229 The contractor asserted that, despite the express term, it 
was a widely accepted trade custom to honor the prices previously 
posted under long-term supply contracts.230 The Court held that, 
notwithstanding the term’s clarity in allowing ad hoc price increases, 
the jury was at liberty to construe the trade usage of “price protection 
as consistent with the express term.”231 The role of contextual 
evidence was prominent in this case. Despite clear, unambiguous 
contract language, the court allowed the jury to use evidence of trade 
 
 225. See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (1977) (stating, however, that “the express terms of 
an agreement and any applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or 
usage of trade must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each 
other”). 
 226. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 11 (placing no limitation on the extrinsic 
evidence that parties can introduce, and as a result, the decision maker must decide 
how much weight each piece of evidence is accorded). 
 227. See supra Parts II.B.1-2. 
 228. 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (reaching its holding, in part, by using 
extrinsic evidence that spoke to the intent of the parties in making the contract). 
 229. Id. at 778. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 780. 
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custom to trump the operation of the express term.232 
 4. Party-Controlled Rules of Interpretation 
 Given the inherent ambiguity of written contracts, be it 
intended or unintended, is there anything the contracting parties can 
do to prevent the admission of extrinsic evidence in a subsequent 
dispute? The principle of private autonomy suggests that the parties 
should be allowed to agree on how their contract is to be 
interpreted.233  
One way to overcome the inefficiency of determining and 
applying default rules of interpretation, be it under common or civil 
law, is for the parties to agree ex ante on the post hoc rules of 
interpretation.234 For example, the parties may agree to avoid the 
application of the contra proferentem rule.235 A contract could 
incorporate the following clause: “The parties agree that any rule of 
construction to the effect that ambiguities are to be resolved against 
the drafting party shall not be applied in the construction or 
interpretation of this Agreement.” However, there is no guarantee 
that a court will disregard traditional rules of interpretation in the 
face of such a provision.236 
Party-determined rules of interpretation fare better in the common 
law. The incorporation of a merger clause generally meets with 
favorable judicial enforcement.237 This is likely because such clauses 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Katz, supra note 191, at 178-80 (indicating that parties could include in 
the contract terms specifying the interpretive methods to be used in the event a 
contractual gap arises). 
 234. See id. at 179 (“Contracting parties can also opt into relatively formalistic 
interpretative regimes by designating the tribunal or rule of law that will hear any 
dispute that arises under their agreement; and again there are various ways to 
achieve such a result.”) 
 235. See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 396, 406 (2009) (defining contra proferentum as a principle 
“under which ambiguous language in the contract is interpreted against the 
drafter”). 
 236. See Katz, supra note 191, at 179 (“Even when the substantive rule of 
interpretation is the same, differences in local legal culture, procedural and 
evidentiary rules, or other resource constraints may make one tribunal considerably 
less inclined to take an open-ended approach to gap filling than another.”). 
 237. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 
YALE L.J. 936, 959-60 (2010) (indicating that utilization of a hard parol evidence 
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align with the traditional rules of interpretation. The merger clause 
expressly warrants that the contract is a final and complete 
integration of the parties’ agreement.238 Its preclusion of the use of 
parol evidence to interpret or add to the contract’s meaning is the 
same result as if the court, independent of any merger clause, 
determined that the contract was a complete integration. Thus, a 
merger clause acts to mimic the parol evidence rule in order to assure 
its applicability. It is doubtful that a merger clause will prevent the 
entry of extrinsic evidence under CISG rules. CISG Advisory 
Council Opinion No.3 attempts to clarify the enforceability of a 
merger clause within the CISG’s liberal evidence regime.239 It states: 
A Merger Clause, also referred to as an Entire Agreement Clause, when in 
a contract governed by the CISG, derogates from norms of interpretation 
and evidence contained in the CISG. The effect may be to prevent a party 
from relying on evidence of statements or agreements not contained in the 
writing. Moreover, if the parties so intend, a Merger Clause may bar 
evidence of trade usages.240  
The Opinion thus affirms that a merger clause may be viewed as a 
permissible derogation under CISG Article 6. However, unless it is 
expressly negotiated and agreed to, it is unlikely to bar extrinsic 
evidence.241 
D.  CONTRACT FORMATION 
The article’s assessment of specific provisions in the CISG closes 
with an inquiry into issues associated with contact formation. As a 
general rule, civil and common law traditions evolved similar rules 
regarding contract formation and performance. Examples include 
 
rule by common law courts gives merger clauses presumptive conclusive effect). 
 238. See id. at 932 n.16 (defining such a clause as one indicating that all of the 
parties’ prior understandings are encompassed in the present written agreement). 
 239. CISG Advisory Council, CISG-AC Opinion No. 3 on Parol Evidence Rule, 
Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG (Oct. 23, 2004), 
available at http://www.cisgac.com/UserFiles/File/CISg%20AC%20Opinion%203 
%20English.pdf. 
 240. Id. at Opinion, ¶ 3. 
 241. CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3 notes that when there is a written 
merger clause, “in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause, the parties' 
statements and negotiations, as well as all other relevant circumstances shall be 
taken into account.” Id.; see infra Part III (exploring the notion of particularized 
consent). 
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rules pertaining to anticipatory repudiation,242 transfer of risk,243 
implied warranties of merchantability and for a particular purpose,244 
the foreseeability limitation on damages,245 the mitigation 
principle,246 and excuse.247 In each of these areas, the drafters of the 
CISG followed the “common core” approach, and adopted the 
approaches common to both legal traditions.248 However, with regard 
to two formation issues—effectiveness of acceptance and firm 
offer—the common law and civil law diverge. Interestingly, in each 
case the CISG offers a compromise, fabricating a modified third 
approach—an amalgamation of conflicting civil and common law 
rules.249 
1. Effectiveness of Acceptance 
Regarding the effectiveness of an acceptance, the common law 
offers the mailbox rule—whereby an acceptance is deemed effective 
on dispatch by the offeree, rather than on receipt by the offeror.250 
The mailbox rule protects the offeree’s expectations by forming the 
contract at the moment of dispatch.251 From an efficiency 
perspective, the rule misallocates the risk that the acceptance will not 
reach the offeror by placing the risk on the less efficient insurer.252 
Under the rule, the risk of a lost transmission is on the offeror despite 
 
 242. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 71-72. 
 243. Id. arts. 66-70. 
 244. Id. art. 35. 
 245. Id. art. 74. 
 246. Id. art. 77. 
 247. Id. art. 79. 
 248. Id. arts. 35, 66-72, 74, 77, 79. 
 249. Id. arts. 16(1), 16(2)(b), 18(2); infra Parts II.D.1-2. 
 250. The mailbox rule traces to the King’s Bench. See Adams v. Lindsell, 
[1818] 106 Eng. Rep. 250, 252 (K.B.) (holding that buyer was allowed to recover 
damages for breach of contract from the seller, where buyer sent his acceptance of 
seller’s offer via mail but the arrival of letter was delayed, by no fault of the buyer, 
and where seller sold the property in question to a third party before hearing back 
from buyer in a timely fashion). 
 251. See Courtenay Canedy, Comment, The Prison Mailbox Rule and Passively 
Represented Prisoners, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 773, 775-76 (2009) (reviewing 
the traditional rationales offered in defense of the mailbox rule, such as its function 
“as a shield to the offeree’s reliance interests”). 
 252. See generally Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation By 
Promise and the Need for the Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 KY. L.J. 557, 565, 
583 (1991) (arguing on both economic and other grounds that the mailbox rule 
needs to be reformed). 
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the fact that the offeree is the party most able to effectuate 
delivery.253 
Article 18(2) of the CISG rejects the common law’s mailbox rule 
in favor of the civil law’s receipt doctrine.254 The allocation of 
transmission risk to the more efficient insurer supports the receipt 
rule. Article 16(1) of the CISG addresses the common law’s 
expectancy protection rationale by freezing the offeror’s right to 
revoke once the acceptance is dispatched.255 However, if the 
acceptance does not reach the offeror within a reasonable time, then 
the receipt rule reinstates—or “unfreezes”—the offeror’s right to 
revoke the offer.256 Taken together, Articles 18 and 16 provide a 
creative set of rules allowing for the adoption of the civil law’s 
receipt rule while protecting the expectancy interest to which the 
common law’s dispatch rule is directed. 
2. Firm Offer Rule 
In the area of firm offer, both civil and common law jurisdictions 
recognize the importance of prohibiting merchant sellers from 
revoking offers that the offeree reasonably expects to remain open. 
However, under the U.C.C., the reasonableness determination is 
made by the Code’s enunciation of formal requirements—the offeror 
must assure that the offer will remain open for a fixed time not 
exceeding ninety days, it must be in writing, and signed by the 
offeror.257 The CISG, by contrast, expands the breadth of the firm 
offer principle, rendering irrevocable any offer on which the offeree 
reasonably relied.258 
The advantage of the U.C.C. approach is that it provides a bright-
 
 253. See id. at 566 (discussing the operation of the rule and the unbargained-for 
protection given to the offeree). 
 254.  CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2); see Gyula Eörsi, Problems of Unifying Law 
on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 27 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 311, 317-19 (1979) (discussing the doctrine and defining it as one in 
which withdrawal, revocation, and acceptance of an offer become effective only 
when received by the other party). 
 255. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1). 
 256. Id. art. 18(2). Reasonable time is determined by the “circumstances of the 
transaction” and the “rapidity of the means of communication employed by the 
offeror.” Id. 
 257. U.C.C. § 2-205 (1977). 
 258. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(2)(b). 
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line rule that is efficient to administer. The formalities of a writing, a 
signature, and a fixed time provide strong proof of a firm offer. The 
problem with the CISG’s approach is that there is no foolproof 
means by which an offeror can prevent a post hoc determination that 
he made a firm offer. Although Article 6 of the CISG allows for the 
derogation from CISG rules by agreement of the parties,259 there is 
no certainty that a court will recognize an affirmation in the offer that 
it is not open or that it will remain open only for a shorter than 
customary time. When there is such an affirmation, the question 
becomes whether the offeree can reasonable rely on the offer beyond 
the time period stipulated in the offer. There is a plausible argument 
that a recognized trade usage—perhaps one where an offer typically 
remains open for a certain period—may trump a provision in the 
offer stating otherwise, especially if the provision is in a standard 
form. 
The CISG’s firm offer rule’s failure to adopt a formality 
requirement is consistent with the fact that the CISG does not require 
a writing for contract formation. The interpretation rules used to 
determine whether an offer is firm are the same as the rules for 
interpreting a consummated contract.260 The CISG’s recognition of 
international trade usage in contract interpretation is the context in 
which the offeree’s reasonable reliance is likely to be determined.261 
Practices developed by merchants in a given trade generally provide 
an efficient means of applying the firm offer rule.262 Hence, the 
drafters of the CISG once again seem to have fabricated a hybrid 
rule, adopting the common law firm offer principle, but allowing it to 
evolve over time through trade usage and business custom. 
 
 259. Id. art. 6. 
 260. See Ferrari, supra note 47, at 76-77 (discussing differing opinions as to 
good faith and its interaction with the CISG in interpretation and offers). 
 261. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9 (stating that unless a usage was observed by 
the parties, it is not valid unless it is one of the usage regularly recognized in 
international trade). 
 262. Cf. Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L. 
REV. 31, 31 (2000) (making the point that firm offers will become more prevalent 
in the future as merchants look to branch out and make deals in unfamiliar 
markets). 
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III. PARTICULARIZED CONSENT: MOVING 
BEYOND LAW TO BEST PRACTICES 
In order to avoid the regulatory function of contract law and frame 
the interpretation process, the use of particularized consent is the 
most efficient means of accomplishing these goals. Particularized 
consent is the use of some means, such as negotiation, legal 
representation, disclosure, or initialing, to heighten the awareness of 
the other contracting party to particular contract terms.263 The use of 
particularized consent in the international sales setting is the best 
practice for ensuring the enforcement of important contract terms 
because it merges the subjective and objective approaches to contract 
law. Obtaining particularized consent provides a heightened 
objective base to prevent the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict 
the enforcement of a contract provision.264 It also establishes an 
evidentiary base against the party seeking the non-enforcement of a 
contract provision by showing that she did know or should have 
known the meaning and intent of the provision.265 
The use of particularized consent is especially important to 
buttress the enforcement of non-material or fine print terms that one 
of the contracting parties deems important. In the battle of the forms 
scenario, a heightened consent method increases the chances that the 
designated terms will be enforced.266 The method of particularized 
consent consists of the building of evidence of knowledge and 
consent in order to overcome the admission of contradictory extrinsic 
evidence.267 From an efficiency perspective, a party should consider 
the use of particularized consent when the benefits of enhancing its 
enforceability are greater than the additional transaction costs 
incurred to particularize the consent. 
Most legal systems provide a number of immutable rules, mostly 
in the consumer contract scenario, that aim to ensure the form-
receiving party’s awareness of certain contract terms. The U.C.C. 
 
 263. E.g., DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 22, at 166-68. 
 264. E.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law 
and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 612-14 (1990). 
 265. See id. (inferring that actual knowledge of a term warrants its enforcement). 
 266. See id. at 614 (suggesting further that in order to ensure enforceability of a 
subordinate clause, a seller should not only obtain buyer consent to the central 
terms of the clause, but also disclose the exact meaning and effect of the clause). 
 267. Id. 
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provides a limited example of the importance of demonstrating 
actual consent in the enforcement of a sales contract—in areas such 
as the exclusion of warranties—by recognizing the importance of 
conspicuousness.268 The purpose of the conspicuousness requirement 
is to enhance the likelihood of true consent by alerting the form 
receiving party of the importance of the particular term.269 The 
requirement of conspicuousness in areas such as disclaimer of 
liability and warranty avoidance, set forth in the U.C.C. and the 
Magnusson-Moss Act,270 is as close as American contract law, 
generally, gets to the notion of particularized consent. This is a weak 
form of particularized consent because it rests on the premise that 
merely displaying terms in a conspicuous manner will lead the 
receiving party to a better understanding of the terms’ content. The 
rationale is that such conspicuousness provides a cautionary 
incentive to read and understand the terms.271  
The United States’ Uniform Computer Information Transactions 
Act (“UCITA”) provides a more robust particularized consent 
regime, albeit in a limited context, by requiring that contracts 
involving the use of self-help remedies “separately manifest assent to 
. . . the use of electronic self-help.”272 In a more general context, the 
European Union’s Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 
dictates “that a contractual term which has not been individually 
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights 
 
 268. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). Conspicuity is merely a procedural device or 
formality. The U.C.C. states that “[c]onspicuous terms include the following: . . . 
(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in 
contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; 
and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the 
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the 
same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other 
marks that call attention to the language.” Id. § 1-201(b). 
 269. See Robert M. Lloyd, The “Circle of Assent” Doctrine: An Important 
Innovation in Contract Law, 7 TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 244 (2006) (reiterating that a 
writing is sufficiently conspicuous under the U.C.C. if the writing is of a larger 
size or in a contrasting color). 
 270. See supra note 268; Magnusson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1975). 
 271. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b) (“‘Conspicuous’ with reference to a term, means so 
written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to 
operate ought to have noticed it.”). 
 272. U.C.I.T.A. § 816 (2002). 
2011] COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY 423 
and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the 
consumer.”273 In the event that there has been no individualized 
agreement, Article 4 (1) provides that: 
[T]he unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into 
account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was 
concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all 
the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the 
other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is 
dependent.274 
The Hungarian Civil Code, in introducing its national law rules on 
unfair terms, provides that when assessing the unfairness of a 
contractual term, “all of the circumstances leading to the conclusion 
of the contract as well as the nature of the stipulated service and the 
relationship of the condition in question with other contract 
conditions and other contracts.”275 British courts also insist on a 
totality of the circumstances analysis when applying the U.K.’s 
unfair contracts legislation.276 One commentator observes that “the 
extent to which the other side [is] familiar with the particular term” 
is crucial to determining whether the term is enforceable under U.K. 
law.277  
A final example of the use of particularized consent is found in the 
Principles of European Contract Law which states that “terms which 
have been individually negotiated take preference over those which 
have not.”278 More telling is Article 2:104 (“Terms Not Individually 
 
 273. Council Directive 93/13, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC) (emphasis added). 
 274. Id. art. 4. 
 275. 1959. Évi IV. törvény a Polgàri Törvénykönyv (Act IV of 1959 on the Civil 
Code) § 209/B(3) (Hung.). 
 276. English Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50, § 11(1) (U.K.); see 
Salvage Ass’n v. CAP Fin. Serv. Ltd. (1995) F.S.R. 654 (Q.B.) 678 (U.K.) 
(analyzing the fairness and reasonableness of two contract provisions in light of 
Section 11(1) of the 1977 Act). 
 277. Richard Lawson, Matter of Construction, 156 NEW L.J. 1310, 1311 (2006) 
(emphasis added). Reiter and Swan use the reasonable expectations approach to 
determine contractual intent and which terms and standards the parties are 
expected to enforce. They suggest that “[t]he court should [] strive to protect the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, discovered through experience in living or 
through expert evidence where it is helpful.” Barry J. Reiter & John Swan, 
Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, in STUDIES IN CONTACT 
LAW 1, 8 (Barry J. Reiter & John Swan eds., 1980). 
 278. Principles of European Contract Law [PECL] art. 5:104 (1999). 
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Negotiated”) which states that non-negotiated terms cannot be 
enforced against a party unless “the party invoking them took 
reasonable steps to bring them to the other party’s attention before or 
when the contract was concluded.”279 It further raises the threshold of 
notice by stating that “terms are not brought appropriately to a 
party’s attention by a mere reference to them in the contract 
document, even if that party signs the document.”280 Accordingly, 
these guidelines should be used by the international merchant to 
ensure the enforcement of contract terms. Obtaining particularized 
consent is especially warranted when the seller transacts business 
through intermediaries, such as a foreign sales representative, to 
ensure that there is strong evidence that the ultimate purchasers have 
given knowing consent to the terms important to the seller. 
Under general economic theory, the providing of additional 
information, transaction costs aside, should lead to more efficient 
contract terms. Knowledge of the existence and meaning of a 
contract term increases the chances that it is the product of 
consent.281 This has been shown to be the case even in the application 
of such doctrines as unconscionability. An empirical study showed 
that consent-based factors, and not substantive fairness, were better 
predictors of unconscionability decisions.282 If consent-based factors 
are present, such as conspicuousness, negotiation, knowledge, or 
being represented by an attorney, a court will rarely find a case of 
unconscionability even in cases of substantive one-sidedness. 
Alternatively stated, the existence of consent-enhancing factors 
greatly increases the likelihood of the enforceability of contract 
terms.  
“When a party seeks to incorporate standard terms into an offer or 
acceptance, courts consider whether such terms have been fairly 
 
 279. Id. art. 2:104(1). 
 280. Id. art. 2:104(2). 
 281. See Meyerson, supra note 264, at 613 (quoting Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[When a party] signs 
a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is 
hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, 
was ever given to all the terms.”). 
 282. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1067 (2006). 
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communicated to the other party.”283 While “the CISG does not 
specifically address the incorporation of standard terms, national 
courts generally agree that the CISG’s provisions on contract 
formation and interpretation determine whether standard terms have 
been validly incorporated into the contract.”284 Alternatively, a view 
can be taken that CISG Article 4 places the issue of validity of 
standard terms clearly outside the CISG’s scope and puts it within 
the domestic law domain.285 
The argument here is not that the CISG requires or even 
encourages particularized consent of certain contract terms, but that 
it is a best practice for parties to obtain particularized consent to 
terms they deem important. The additional transaction costs of 
obtaining such consent are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of 
increasing the probability of enforcement. Offhand, the terms for 
which particularized consent would most commonly produce 
efficiency gains include: arbitration, price adjustment, warranties, 
notice of non-conformity requirements, unusual force majeure 
events, extended inspection rights, damages, and remedy limitation 
clauses. 
Assuming the efficiency of obtaining particularized consent on 
certain contract terms, the issue becomes how much information 
needs to be communicated to the form or contract receiving party? 
Civil law legal systems emphasize that a party must be reasonably 
aware of the terms the other seeks to incorporate, but how does one 
measure reasonable awareness? 
In general, although not expressly stated in the CISG, the burden 
of proof falls on the party who benefits from proving a proposition. 
In the case of standard terms, the party that argues that its standard 
terms are part of the contract is required to prove that the parties 
agreed to their incorporation.286 Standard terms—generally referred 
to in Europe as “general conditions”—are often not discussed in the 
negotiation of a sales contract, making proof of express agreement to 
 
 283. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 22, at 64. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13, supra note 273, art. 3 (indicating that the 
seller or supplier has the burden of proving that the term was individually 
negotiated). 
426 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:2 
their incorporation difficult to prove .287 
There are a number of factual scenarios in which the incorporation 
of standard terms is at issue. The first scenario arises at the formation 
of the contract, when a party attempts to insert its standard terms into 
the contract—sometimes by simply referencing their existence.288 
The second arises when a party attempts to insert its standard terms 
subsequent to the formation of the contract—often done by placing 
the standard terms in a subsequent document, such as an invoice, 
packing slip, or purchase order.289 Lastly, the third arises when both 
parties attempt to insert their own standard terms into the contract at 
the time of formation, resulting in conflicting terms.290  
This analysis of the use of particularized consent is primarily 
directed at the first scenario. Particularized consent’s main purpose is 
ensuring the enforcement of a term in the contract. The courts 
generally respond to the second scenario by holding that standard 
terms cannot be unilaterally incorporated into a contract subsequent 
to its formation.291 The third scenario is the phenomenon known as 
“the battle of the forms.” Due to the complexity of the battle of forms 
and its treatment under Article 19 of the CISG, the third scenario is 
 
 287. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Sept. 13, 2001, docket 
No. 6 Ob 73/01f (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/ 
010913a3.html (recognizing the requirement that the receiving party be aware of 
the standard terms, but noting that awareness can be implied and, therefore, 
acceptance of the terms can be implicit). 
 288. See id. (indicating that implied inclusion of a standard term can be effected 
only under strict prerequisites). 
 289. See id. (describing the possibility for a standard term to be impliedly added 
to the contract when the term was “hinted to” in the context of a long-term 
business relationship and there had no objection to the term). 
 290. See Kaia Wildner, Art. 19 CISG: The German Approach to the Battle of the 
Forms in International Contract Law: The Decision of the Federal Supreme Court 
of Germany of 9 January 2002, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (identifying this 
method as a “battle of forms” in which parties exchange forms containing standard 
terms that conflict). 
 291. E.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 
531 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a forum selection clause was not part of the 
contract as it was not included in the initial oral agreements, but was instead added 
in later invoices); Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd v. Sabaté USA Inc., [2005] O.J. 
No. 4604, ¶¶ 29-31 (Can. Ont. Master) (reaching the same conclusion—that the 
forum selection clause on the invoices did not constitute part of the contracts 
between the parties). 
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not part of the current discussion.292 This is mainly due to the fact 
that a single party has little control, if any, over the standard terms 
that a court will recognize in the battle of the forms scenario.  
The question remains what is the best method to incorporate 
standard terms at the time of contract formation? The common 
approach recognizes that the incorporating party holds the risk of 
non-incorporation, and thereby has the burden of proof. As a 
practical matter, the incorporating party should lay an evidentiary 
base for fulfilling its burden of proof that the terms were an agreed-to 
part of the contract. Some courts require the terms be made available 
to the other party prior to or at the time the contract is formed.293 A 
court will reject such an attempt to incorporate standard terms if it 
determines that the parties concluded an oral agreement, which 
lacked those terms, prior to the exchange of documents or the 
providing of standard terms.294 This was the case in ISEA Industrie 
S.p.A. v. Lu S.A., where despite the fact that the standard terms of the 
buyer were included on the back of a document signed by the seller, 
the court held that the incorporation was ineffective.295 
The majority of CISG case law holds that the receiving party must 
be made aware of the standard terms by the incorporating party. 
Further, the incorporating party must communicate its intent that the 
terms should be incorporated into the contract. In 2010, an American 
court rejected a buyer’s argument that it never agreed to the seller’s 
standard terms placed into the seller’s offer, where there was some 
evidence that the buyer was aware of those terms and the seller’s 
intent to incorporate them.296 The buyer argued “that the mere receipt 
 
 292. For a detailed analysis of how the CISG, and in particular Germany, treats 
conflicting standard terms, see generally Wildner, supra note 290. 
 293. Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: 
An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
299, 346-47 (2004). 
 294. E.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd., 328 F.3d at 531. 
 295. Cour d’appel [CA] [Regional Court of Appeals] Paris, Dec. 13, 1995 (Fr.), 
available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951213f1.html (determining that the 
terms and conditions present on the back of the form signed by the seller were not 
accepted because there was no reference to the terms at the time the seller signed). 
 296. Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CVF 09-
1424 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 347897, *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (indicating that 
because the terms were sent as an attachment to the offer, and there was evidence 
that the buyer opened some of the attachments, the buyer cannot say that they were 
unaware of the terms and conditions sent to them by the seller). 
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of the General Conditions [was] not enough to accept the 
conditions,”297 but the court held that the buyer accepted the standard 
terms of the offer when it sold the product to a third-party.298 
Therefore, the court considered the terms to be accepted by conduct. 
As previously discussed, a successful incorporation of standard 
terms requires a threshold of awareness or knowledge by the non-
incorporating party and a showing of intent by the incorporating 
party to incorporate the terms at the time of formation. The 
requirements of awareness and intent are generally interrelated. A 
party’s awareness of the other party’s standard terms can be the basis 
for a finding of intent. An Austrian court noted that incorporation 
will be implied if the terms are “included in the proposal . . . in a way 
that the other party under the given circumstances knew or could not 
have been reasonably unaware of [the] intent” to incorporate the 
terms.299 It further noted that intent can be established through 
express or implied reference in the offer, as well as through the 
contract negotiations or through an established practice.300  
As noted above, incorporation can be based upon an established 
practice of the parties through a course of dealings. The importance 
of the existence of a long-term relationship played a key role in a 
recent Dutch case, which dealt with the issue of whether the 
acceptance of an offer that merely referenced the seller’s standard 
terms constituted an acceptance of those terms.301 The court noted 
that “there was no established business relationship between the 
parties,” so therefore simple reference to the standard terms was 
insufficient to make the terms part of the contract.302 Additionally the 
seller should have provided to “the buyer a reasonable opportunity 
before or at the time of concluding the contract . . . to become aware 
of the . . . general conditions.”303 Since this had not occurred, the 
 
 297. Id. at *4. 
 298. See id. (indicating that pursuant to CISG Art. 19, a buyer may assent to 
buying goods through conduct relating to payment or dispatch of goods). 
 299. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 2003, docket No. 7 
Ob 275/03x (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031217 
a3.html. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Rb Utrecht 21 jaunuari 2009, HA ZA 08-1642 (GmbH/Quote Foodprints 
B.V.) (Neth.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090121n1.html. 
 302. Id. at Editorial Remarks. 
 303. Id. 
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Dutch court concluded that the buyer could not reasonably acquire an 
understanding that the terms would become part of the contract.304  
In an earlier case, a German court took a hard view of intent as 
requiring express agreement to the existence and content of the 
standard terms.305 However, the court noted that intent to accept an 
offer or counteroffer containing the standard terms can be implied. It 
held that the urging by the original offeror (buyer) for immediate 
delivery would generally constitute an acceptance of the seller’s 
counteroffer including the standard terms.306 But, ultimately, the 
court held that because the seller’s standard terms were available 
only in the German language, they were not incorporated into the 
contract—the language of which was English.307 Notwithstanding 
this holding, the trend is that incorporation of the terms is appropriate 
if done so in any major language used in international business 
dealings.  
Another German court noted that the final arbiter of whether 
standard terms are incorporated is the reasonable person.308 In that 
case, the buyer placed a number of orders with a seller who 
responded by sending written order confirmations containing the 
seller’s standard terms. The court held that in applying the 
reasonable person standard, a certain threshold of communication 
regarding the standard terms was necessary before the terms could be 
deemed incorporated into the contract. This evidentiary threshold 
included proof that “the recipient . . . must be provided with the 
general terms and conditions, or [the recipient] must be given the 
opportunity to reasonably get to know [them].”309 The court 
determined that the evidentiary threshold was met, stating that the 
 
 304.  In its decision, the court invoked German case law “on the application of 
general conditions on the basis of the CISG, which emphasizes that general 
conditions will only be applicable if the text of such conditions is handed over to 
the offeree before or at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” Id. 
 305. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court] Apr. 21, 
2004, 15 U 88/08 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040421 
g3.html. 
 306. Id. ¶ 1(b)(bb)(1). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Oberlandesgericht München [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court] Jan. 14, 
2009, 20 U 3683/08 (Ger.), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090114 
g1.html. 
 309. Id. 
 430 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:2 
receiving party must have taken notice of the standard terms included 
in the footers of the confirmations as the first order was 
countersigned and returned.310 In essence, the court held that standard 
terms inserted into an offer or acceptance met the awareness and 
intent requirements for incorporation.  
In the above case, the German court did not rule on whether 
standard terms could be incorporated merely by reference in the offer 
or acceptance, due to the fact that the standard term at issue was 
written into the confirmation.311 On the other hand, it does not 
expressly reject the notion that the full set of standard terms, not 
expressly written into the offer or acceptance, may be incorporated 
into the contract in some circumstances. In cases where there is clear 
intent of a party to incorporate its standard terms or the reference was 
made over a long course of dealings and the other party failed to 
object, a finding of an implicit agreement may be reached.312 As an 
aside, the fact that there was no reference in the body of the seller’s 
form to the standard terms—which were included exclusively in the 
document’s footnotes—was not considered important by the court. 
Some courts refuse to enforce terms that derogate from CISG rules 
without proof of particularized express consent. Article 6 states that 
“parties may exclude the application of this Convention . . . or 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”313 
However, excluding or varying the application of a CISG provision 
may require more than inserting an express term in the written 
contract. For example, an Italian court held that the party seeking to 
enforce the derogation must prove the other party’s awareness of the 
relevant CISG provision and the express intent to exclude it.314  
 
 310. See id. (arguing that the buyer is expected to comprehensively check 
communications and take notice of any terms and conditions indicated therein). 
 311. See id. (“Buyer is [] expected to check the written communications 
comprehensively and to take notice of the general terms and conditions included 
therein.”). 
 312. E.g., Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec. 17, 2003, docket 
No. 7 Ob 275/03x (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031217 
a3.html. 
 313. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. 
 314. See Tribunale di Padova, 25 febbfraio 2004, No. 40552 (It.), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040225i3.html (indicating that knowledge of the 
CISG’s applicability must be clearly shown before the court can credit the parties’ 
intent to have the domestic rule operate). 
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Another example of the need for particularized consent relates to 
the express recognition of CISG’s Article 29 that a contract can 
require modifications to be made in writing.315 However, an Austrian 
court rejected that such a provision is sufficient to derogate from 
Article 11’s no writing requirement by failing to enforce a writing 
requirement clause inserted into a standard form contract.316 The 
court held that such a writing requirement is enforceable only if the 
party against whom it is being asserted gave informed consent.317 
In sum, due to the CISG’s liberal use of extrinsic evidence, the 
most efficient means to ensure enforcement of “important” terms is 
the implementation of procedural steps designed to obtain 
particularized consent. Particularized consent should be recognized 
as a best practice when the costs of obtaining consent, including the 
probability that the term would be construed as a deal-breaker, is 
outweighed by the value of ensuring the term’s enforceability, 
diminished by the probability of the term’s use. Such an approach is 
aligned with the underlying EAL assumption that terms that are a 
true expression of the parties’ intent are the most efficient. 
IV. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE 
EAL 
It has been argued elsewhere that comparative EAL is a relatively 
useless method for comparing laws from different national legal 
systems. The argument is that the differences in legal culture often 
justify the development of different contract rules and at the same 
time are efficient within each given cultural context.318 Professors 
Alpa and Giampieri assert that: 
 
 315. CISG, supra note 1, art. 29. 
 316. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 6, 1996, docket No. 
10 Ob 518/95 (Austria), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960206 
a3.html (determining that the seller’s general conditions in the contract were not 
agreed upon, and therefore the writing requirement did not govern as the other 
party was not aware of the requirement). 
 317. Id. 
 318. See Guido Alpa & Alberto Giampieri, Law and Economics and Method 
Analysis: The Contractual Damages Issue, JUS (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/ 
cardozo/review/Contract/Alpa-1995/alpa.html#damages (highlighting the negative 
treatment of voluntary breach by the French and Italian legal systems compared to 
the tendency in English common law to disregard voluntary breach). 
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The analysis of some of the rules related to the breach of contract and the 
relative damages recovery techniques shows that the models of law and 
economics cannot be always applied: they are always based either on a 
certain law system or on legal concepts typical to a peculiar experience; 
the adoption of a perfect, ideal, abstract model may be useful as a general 
framework, but, in order to achieve practical results, it is necessary to 
carry out an analysis in light of the applicable law, taking into account the 
interpretation given by the jurisprudence and the concepts on which same 
is grounded.319 
The present article considered instances where the CISG chose 
among rules from different legal regimes, and the adopted rule in 
most cases was taken from the civil law. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that the civil law is more efficient, as oftentimes 
the apparent choice of one rule still ended with hybridized results. 
For example, it was noted that CISG’s Article 18(2) rejects the 
common law’s mailbox rule in favor of a receipt rule.320 But, Article 
16(1) addresses the major concern underlying the mailbox rule 
(offeree’s expectation of contract formation) by freezing the offeror’s 
right to revoke the offer upon the dispatch of the acceptance.321 
Another example of divergence is the CISG’s rejection of the 
U.C.C.’s perfect tender rule in favor of the fundamental breach rule. 
The perfect tender and the fundamental breach rules are relatively 
efficient within the context of their use.322 As noted in Part I.A.1., in 
the U.S. domestic market, the seller’s costs of retrieving or trans-
shipping goods to another buyer, following a rejection, does not 
amount to the incurring of undue costs. Therefore, the perfect tender 
rule is better suited for domestic market transactions. In contrast, 
having goods rejected in a faraway country is likely to result in 
substantial expenses to the seller. In addition, the buyer in an 
international transaction is the more efficient party to obtain some 
value for the non-conforming goods. In the international sales 
scenario, the fundamental breach approach is the more efficient rule. 
Also, the divergence between the CISG’s fundamental breach rule 
 
 319. Id. 
 320. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2); see supra notes 254-56 and accompanying 
text. 
 321. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1) ; see supra notes 254-56 and accompanying 
text. 
 322. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
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and the U.C.C.’s perfect tender rule is not as great as it may seem.  
Reviewing the U.C.C. as a whole shows that the absolute right of the 
buyer to reject non-conforming tenders of goods under the perfect 
tender rule is not so absolute. That right is qualified by U.C.C. 
Sections 2-602 and 2-603, which require, respectively, that the buyer 
inspect the goods within a reasonable time and give reasonable 
notice or lose the right to reject,323 and “after rejection . . . follow any 
reasonable instructions received from the seller with respect to the 
goods . . . .”324 In the absence of such instructions, it further obligates 
the buyer to obtain salvage value for goods that are “perishable or 
threaten to decline in value speedily.”325 Thus, the CISG rule, context 
aside, is not as divergent from the common law rule as initially 
perceived, and relative efficiency of result is closer than the rejection 
rule would indicate.  
A.  EVOLUTIONARY EFFICIENCY 
 Judge Posner argued that the common law is generally made 
up of efficient rules.326 The reason given for such efficiency is that 
courts in deciding cases intuitively use an economic analysis in the 
application of legal rules. Others extended this theory to argue that 
the common law becomes more efficient over time.327 One version of 
 
 323. See U.C.C. § 2-602 (1977). Compare CISG, supra note 1, art. 38, with id. 
art. 39. 
 324. U.C.C. § 2-603(1) (1977). 
 325. Id. 
 326.  See POSNER, supra note 10, at 98 (explaining that the “common law 
method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting 
activities in such a way as to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the 
same thing, minimize the joint cost of the activities”). 
 327. See generally John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of 
Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978) (suggesting that efficiency increases 
are the result of either judges preferring efficiency or a process of natural selection 
whereby more efficient rules persist and less efficient ones are replaced or 
overruled); Priest, supra note 8 (noting that even when both parties are not 
interested in setting a precedent, the common law still evolves toward efficiency); 
Rubin, supra note 60 (indicating that when both parties are interested in setting 
precedent, inefficient rules will evolve out of the law); Jeffrey Evans Stake, 
Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee 
Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 FL. ST. L. REV. 401 (2005) (positing that internal 
and external competition helps to develop efficient rules in the common law 
process). But see generally Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven Willborn, The Efficiency 
of the Common Law Reconsidered, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157 (1991) (arguing 
against the purported general tendency of the common law to evolve efficiently; 
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this evolutionary model asserts that those cases most likely to be 
disputed involve inefficient rules.328 Disputes involving the 
application of efficient rules are more likely to be settled out of 
court. Thus, courts over time are given the opportunity to work 
inefficient rules out of the common law. Professor Rubin qualifies 
this assertion by noting that evolutionary efficiency is not uniform 
throughout the common law because it depends more on the 
characteristics of the litigants than it does on the actions of judges.329 
Evolutionary efficiency is most likely to happen when both parties 
to the dispute are interested in setting a precedent where the existing 
rule is inefficient.330 The only further modification of this version of 
evolutionary theory is that the characteristics of the parties change 
over time. Cases of only one or no interested parties could become 
cases of two interested parties. This is likely to happen in response to 
changes in the market—or government regulation thereof. From the 
perspective of the long-term evolution of legal rules, all rules will 
evolve towards efficiency or the government will intervene in an 
 
necessity of “recurrence, legal standing of cost-bearers, representativeness, and 
stability” probably apply only in reality to a small portion of cases within the 
common law system or do not exist at all); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories 
of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 425 (2005) (making the point that common law rule-making is limited by 
bounded rationality; common law change is often inadvertent). 
 328. See Hirsch, supra note 327, at 428 (indicating that “relentless pressure of 
periodic, lopsided litigation exerts itself upon an inefficient rule until it gives 
way”). 
 329. Rubin, supra note 60, at 53. Professor Rubin distinguishes levels of 
evolutionary efficiency based on the characteristics of the disputing parties. The 
pairings of parties is divided into cases where both parties are interested in setting 
a precedent, where only one party is interested in setting a precedent, and where 
neither party is interested in setting a precedent. See id. at 53-57 (analyzing the 
outcomes in each situation). It is only in the first scenario (two-party interest) that 
efficient evolutionary outcomes are most likely. If the defendant in the first 
scenario is subject to an inefficient rule, then he/she will be incentivized to litigate. 
In short, “efficient rules will be maintained, and inefficient rules litigated until 
overturned.” Id. at 53. In the second scenario (one-party interest), the party 
interested in setting or retaining a precedent is over time more likely to get a 
solution favorable to his side. See id. at 55 (suggesting that this is due to the 
tendency for that party to bring many claims to court ). This solution (rule change) 
may not be the most efficient one. In the third scenario (no-party interest), the 
status quo rule will persist because neither party has an incentive to litigate for a 
rule change and are most likely to settle out of court based upon the existing rule. 
Id. at 56. 
 330. Id. at 53. 
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attempt to provide more efficient rules.331 
The importance of the evolutionary efficiency argument is that it is 
internal to a given legal system. If we assume that both the civil and 
common law systems evolve toward more efficient rules, then we are 
still presented with the question of which one is more efficient in 
cases where they have evolved different rules. This is where 
comparative law and economics has a role to play. This comparison 
would be most striking if legal systems were highly insulated. The 
greater the level of insularity the more one would expect to see 
divergence in rules and the relative efficiency of rules.332 This is not 
the case with the civil and common law systems, as both systems 
have been exposed to each over the centuries. This allowed for 
greater convergence in the systems through cross-fertilization, 
transplantation, and harmonization.333 More recently, the evolution of 
the common market assisted convergence in European contract law. 
The CISG provides an opportunity to examine, from an efficiency 
perspective, some of the remaining vestiges of divergence in the law 
of sales. Some argue that when legal systems compete, the more 
efficient one will win the battle of competing rules.334 The findings of 
this article tentatively support this argument. 
 
 331. Cf. id. (indicating that governmental agencies and other corporate bodies 
are repeat players, and thus are necessarily interested in cases both for their 
individual outcomes and precedential value). 
 332. See, e.g., Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and CISG - 
Sources of Inspiration for English Courts?, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2007) 
(explaining how countries that are parties to international conventions often 
interpret them with regard to their existing domestic laws as opposed to 
interpreting the conventions in a way that recognizes their international character). 
 333. See generally id. (explaining that the convergence in European contract law 
is a by-product of the evolution of the common market). 
 334. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the 
Common Law: A Hypothesis, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1-3 (2004) (indicating 
that competition is important in the evolution of efficiency, but that it is not the 
sole factor); Todd J. Zwicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: 
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2003) (discussing the 
competition between courts of concurrent jurisdiction in England and the evolution 
of pro-plaintiff rules). 
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B.  BENEFITS OF COMPARATIVE EAL 
 Comparative EAL is part of a long history of comparative law 
analysis.335 Legal systems borrowed rules from each other for many 
years. Some transplanted entire areas of law. Comparative legal 
historian Alan Watson noted that “legal transplants—the moving of a 
rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one 
people to another—have been common since the earliest recorded 
history.”336 Comparative contract law has existed as long as 
comparative law. Given the different sources—Roman Law for the 
civil law and English judge-made law for the common law—scholars 
continue to compare divergences in the contract law between the two 
systems.337 Due to the divergence in the rules of these two major 
legal systems, business practitioners and legal scholars have long 
sought a harmonizing, supranational law that would facilitate 
transborder transactions. The CISG is a recent product of that search. 
It is only natural that comparative legal scholarship should analyze 
such movements between legal systems. Such a descriptive endeavor 
leads to prescriptive suggestions of which legal system-specific rules 
better respond to modern, international transactions. EAL provides 
one means of choosing between divergent national rules. Private 
international law conventions, like the CISG, provide opportunities 
to apply EAL principles to non-nation-specific private law. This is 
especially true when alternative rules were available to drafters of 
 
 335. See generally Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative 
Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 477 (1995) (presenting the historical perspective of one of 
the founders of modern comparative private law, Professor Schlesinger). See also 
Ferdinand F. Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL. L. REV. 
325, 330 (1951) (indicating that comparative law has long been highlighted as 
important by business, science, government, and social service). 
 336. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 21 (2d ed. 1993). 
 337. See generally CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS 
(Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989) (reporting an academic collaboration 
which concluded that French and English contract law are similar because 
contracts perform the same function in both systems, but that the bodies of law 
diverge in their application); G.H. TREITEL, REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT (1988) (comparing remedies available to the victim for 
breach of contract in civil and common law countries); John D. McCamus, 
Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Perspective, 36 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 943 (2003) (comparing American and English law in regards to 
disgorgement for breach of contract). 
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such conventions. The fact that the CISG is a blend of common and 
civil law rules makes it an ideal avenue for comparative EAL 
scholarship. 
C.  COMPARATIVE EAL AND THE CISG 
The current comparative efficiency analysis suggests three general 
areas for further inquiry—two descriptive and one normative. The 
first area is whether the CISG makes international sales contracting 
more or less efficient. This descriptive analysis can and should be 
done at two levels. The first level—the one implored in this article—
looks at the choices presented to the CISG drafters and the resultant 
adopted rules to assess the efficiency of the selected rules. The 
second level analysis recognizes the likely divergence between the 
rules as written and the rules as applied. This divergence is most 
likely in the CISG context due to the fact that its rules are applied by 
courts from different legal traditions. This divergence requires an 
analysis into whether jurisprudential developments in the application 
of CISG rules make the rules more or less efficient. At the same 
time, an ongoing normative analysis would involve taking the 
findings of the comparative efficiency analysis and asking what 
changes should be considered to make international sales law more 
efficient? 
The intellectual benefit of comparative efficiency analysis in the 
context of the CISG is that it forces the evaluator to critically assess 
nation-specific rules. A major benefit of the use of EAL in 
comparative law is that it improves the means by which scholars 
from different legal traditions are able to communicate. The 
nomenclature of efficiency—transaction costs, most efficient insurer, 
default rules, and wealth maximization—can be applied across legal 
systems. It provides a means to more rigorously describe the 
consequences of competing rules. Economic rationales may also be 
used to justify a compromise between competing rules. The CISG’s 
acceptance of the receipt rule338 can be seen as the proper allocation 
of risk to the best insurer. The freezing of the revocation of offer 
power upon the dispatch of the acceptance339 can be seen as an 
efficient attempt at protecting the expectancy of the offeree. In the 
 
 338. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2). 
 339. CISG, supra note 1, art. 16(1). 
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end, the underlying policies behind the adoption of divergent rules 
among different legal systems cannot be uncovered through EAL. 
Yet, EAL allows for a better description of the degree that 
divergence exists.  
A final example of the descriptive power of EAL can be seen in 
the area of pre-contractual liability. On the surface there seems to be 
two diametrically opposed rules—the civil law’s acceptance of the 
duty of good faith negotiations and the common law’s rejection of 
any good faith obligation prior to contract formation. But in fact, as 
discussed earlier,340 the common law evolved means to overcome the 
inefficiency of a party incurring sunk costs while promoting the 
efficiency of allowing parties the freedom to investigate potentially 
beneficial collaborations without incurring liability. This balance of 
protecting reasonable reliance and not inhibiting exploratory 
negotiations can be seen in the evolution of the common law’s 
principle of promissory estoppel and the recognition that parties can 
enter into a binding agreement to negotiate in good faith.341 
CONCLUSION 
 Law and economics allows for the study of the comparative 
efficiency of rules found in different legal systems. It also allows for 
the normative claim that only the better or more efficient rules 
should be adopted at the level of uniform international sales or 
contract law. The ability to select or fabricate efficient rules offers an 
alternative to a common-core approach to unification and 
harmonization of national laws. The economic analysis of law 
provides a means of selecting the more efficient laws from among 
conflicting national rules.342 
 Additionally, the CISG provides a medium for such a 
comparative analysis, as it is a hybrid or amalgamation of civil and 
common law rules.343 The drafters were faced with competing or 
conflicting rules offered by the two legal systems, and their ultimate 
 
 340. See supra note 107. 
 341. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1039 (2010) (indicating that courts, when analyzing a claim 
for promissory estoppel, tend to look more at the promisee’s reasonable reliance 
than the actual promise). 
 342. See supra Part I.B. 
 343. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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selection of one or the other provides an opportunity to test the 
theoretical efficiency of each. This article begins with such an 
analysis and, in the end, concludes that the drafters were mostly 
successful in selecting the more efficient rules. However, the lack of 
comprehensiveness and the abdication of coverage of numerous 
areas of sales law renders the overall efficiency of the CISG less than 
optimal. 
